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”[F]öre Harrisburg då var det ju ytterst osannolikt att det som hände i Harrisburg 
skulle hända. Men sen så fort det hade hänt, då rakade ju sannolikheten plötsligt 
upp till inte mindre än hundra procent, så att det blev nästan sant att det hade hänt! 
Men bara nästan sant – det är det som är det konstiga. För det är fortfarande som 
om de går omkring och tycker, såhär lite mer i smyg, att det där som hände i Har-
risburg, det var nog så ytterst osannolikt så att egentligen har det nog inte hänt. [---] 
Alltså, jag förstår mycket väl denna […] tvekan, därför att enligt alla hittills till-
gängliga sannolikhetsberäkningar så har det ju varit så att en sån där olycka inträf-
far kanske bara nån enstaka gång på flera tusen år. Jag menar, då är det ju inte sär-
skilt troligt att den skulle ha hänt redan nu, utan det är väl i så fall betydligt mera 
sannolikt att den har inträffat längre fram.  Ja, och då kommer ju saken i ett helt 
annat läge. För […] det kan ju inte vi ta ställning till nu. Då. Eller hur det blir då.” 
 
Tage Danielsson, 1979  
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Summary 
Although public international law is sometimes referred to as the global legal or-
der, its various disciplines are often considered in isolation. It is therefore interest-
ing to investigate the relationships between the disciplines, because if they are too 
distant, it may be hard to claim that public international law is a single legal order. 
The purpose of this thesis is therefore to provide an example for future discus-
sions on the interrelationships between public international law in general and its 
many disciplines, especially international environmental law and international 
human rights law, and on the development of general norms of public internation-
al law. To provide such an example, the thesis investigates if there is a norm of 
precaution in the law of the European Convention on Human Rights, the ECHR, 
similar to or the same as the precautionary principle in international environmen-
tal law. The possibility of a general norm and the importance of terminology in 
that context are also discussed. The aim is not to give definite answers, but to dis-
cuss the possibilities. 
Initially, in section 2, the precautionary principle in international environmental 
law is examined through treaties, literature and case law. In short, the precaution-
ary principle means that action to prevent environmental damage may have to be 
taken when there is a possible risk of such damage. For action to be required, the 
possible damage must not be insignificant and the measures necessary to prevent 
it must be proportionate. The mere fact that the existence of a risk is uncertain is 
not an excuse for inaction, though. The precautionary principle thus only gives 
rough guidelines but may be further specified by other norms to which it is ap-
plied. Its main function is to guide the interpretation of other norms in an envi-
ronmentally friendly way. The precautionary principle has this effect, since the 
acceptance of uncertain risks as reason for action de facto means that the standard 
of proof is lowered and that the burden of proof may be shifted. 
Section 3 is devoted to the ECHR. It is noted that the European Court of Human 
Rights, the ECtHR, interprets the Convention inter alia so as to make the rights 
effective. In the interpretation it can also take account of other rules of interna-
tional law applicable between the parties. Motivated by the need for effectiveness, 
the Court has interpreted many rights as encompassing obligations for states to 
prevent individuals’ rights from being infringed by other actors than the state. 
Thus, a norm of precaution could exist under the ECHR to ensure effectiveness. It 
may or may not exist because of inspiration from the precautionary principle in 
international environmental law. Three categories of case law of the ECtHR are 
reviewed, to give examples that may indicate a norm of precaution. Hence, an 
inductive method is used. The three categories concern state obligations under 
Article 2 to protect the right to life, state obligations under Article 3 to protect 
people from being subjected to ill-treatment (with focus on cases concerning the 
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removal of aliens to other states), and state obligations under Article 8 to protect 
the rights to private and family life etc., in situations with environmental aspects. 
The investigated cases do indicate that there is a norm of precaution in the ECHR 
regime, meaning that, if it is proportionate, states may have to take precautionary 
measures against a risk of a violation of a right. There are many different kinds of 
risks which may threaten human rights, and therefore the required level of risk 
varies. To speak of the uncertain existence of risks (as opposed to the uncertain 
realisation of risks) as in international environmental law, is less suitable here, but 
the Court has at least accepted very tenuous risks as sufficient to require action. 
When comparing the norm of precaution in the ECHR regime with the precau-
tionary principle in international environmental law, in section 4.1, it is argued 
that the norm of precaution is in fact one and the same in the two disciplines, re-
quiring the same conditions to be met in order for precautionary measures to be 
necessary. What varies is the meaning of these conditions, due to the different 
contexts. These adaptations are accommodated within the boundaries of the nec-
essary proportionality assessment, however. This is possible since the norm leaves 
great discretion to states (and/or judiciary) applying it. The requirement of propor-
tionality means that the norm cannot regulate details but only give guidelines. 
In the speculative section 4.2, the fact that the norm of precaution is common in 
international environmental law and the ECHR regime and that it is motivated by 
the need for effective protection of the relevant interests, is considered to indicate 
the possibility of a general norm of precaution. A common (or general) norm is 
not excluded by the lack of a common term, but the use of a common term could 
promote the further development of the common norm and perhaps even inspire 
its application in other disciplines of public international law as well, since com-
mon terms can draw attention to connections which may otherwise be overlooked. 
Finally, it is concluded that regardless of the existence of a common norm of pre-
caution, the investigation implies that there can be similarities between different 
disciplines of public international law which may not be obvious at first glance. It 
would be beneficial to public international law at large if such similarities were 
identified, since it would promote a better understanding of the true nature of pub-
lic international law and its claim on being a single legal order. 
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Sammanfattning 
Fastän folkrätten ibland kallas den globala rättsordningen, betraktas dess olika 
discipliner ofta enskilt. Det är därför intressant att undersöka förhållandena mellan 
disciplinerna, eftersom det är svårt att hävda att folkrätten är ett enskilt rättsom-
råde om de är alltför avlägsna varandra.  Syftet med detta examensarbete är därför 
att ge ett exempel som grund för framtida diskussioner om de inbördes förhållan-
dena mellan folkrätten i allmänhet och dess många discipliner, särskilt internat-
ionell miljörätt och internationella mänskliga rättigheter, och om utvecklingen av 
allmänna folkrättsliga normer. För att tillhandahålla ett sådant exempel undersöks 
i detta examensarbete huruvida det finns en försiktighetsnorm under den europe-
iska konventionen om skydd för de mänskliga rättigheterna, EKMR, som liknar 
eller är densamma som försiktighetsprincipen i internationell miljörätt. Den möj-
liga existensen av en allmän norm och betydelsen av terminologin i det samman-
hanget diskuteras också. Avsikten är inte att ge definitiva svar, utan att diskutera 
möjligheterna. 
Inledningsvis, i avsnitt 2, undersöks försiktighetsprincipen i internationell mil-
jörätt utifrån traktater, litteratur och rättspraxis. I korthet innebär försiktighets-
principen att åtgärder för att förhindra en miljöskada kan behöva vidtas när det 
finns en möjlig risk för sådan skada. För att handling ska krävas, får inte den po-
tentiella skadan vara försumbar och åtgärderna som behövs för att förhindra den 
måste vara proportionella. Endast det faktum att existensen av en risk är osäker är 
dock ingen ursäkt för passivitet. Försiktighetsprincipen ger således bara ungefär-
liga riktlinjer men kan specificeras av de andra normer som den tillämpas på. Dess 
huvudsakliga funktion är nämligen att vägleda tolkningen av andra normer i mil-
jövänlig riktning. Försiktighetsprincipen har denna effekt, eftersom det faktum att 
osäkra risker accepteras som skäl för handling de facto innebär att beviskravet 
sänks och att bevisbördan kan växla. 
Avsnitt 3 ägnas åt EKMR. Det noteras att Europadomstolen för mänskliga rättig-
heter tolkar konventionen bland annat så att rättigheterna ska bli effektiva. Den 
kan vid tolkningen också beakta andra folkrättsliga regler som är tillämpliga mel-
lan parterna. Motiverad av effektivitetskravet har domstolen tolkat många rättig-
heter som att de medför skyldigheter för stater att förhindra att individers rättig-
heter kränks av andra aktörer än staten. Således skulle en försiktighetsnorm kunna 
finnas under EKMR för att just garantera effektiviteten. En sådan norm kan exi-
stera på grund av, eller oberoende av, inspiration från försiktighetsprincipen i in-
ternationell miljörätt. Tre kategorier av rättsfall från Europadomstolen undersöks 
för att ge exempel som kan indikera existensen av en försiktighetsnorm. Följaktli-
gen är det en induktiv metod som används. De tre kategorierna rör statliga förplik-
telser att skydda rätten till liv under artikel 2, statliga förpliktelser under artikel 3 
beträffande skydd av individer från att utsättas för omänsklig behandling m.m. 
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(med fokus på fall som rör förflyttandet av utlänningar till andra stater) samt stat-
liga förpliktelser att skydda rätten till privat- och familjeliv under artikel 8, i situ-
ationer med miljömässiga aspekter. De fall som undersöks antyder att det finns en 
försiktighetsnorm i EKMR-systemet som innebär att stater kan vara tvungna att 
vidta försiktighetsåtgärder gentemot en risk för en kränkning av en rättighet, om 
sådana åtgärder skulle vara proportionerliga. Det finns många olika typer av risker 
som kan hota mänskliga rättigheter och därför varierar nivån på den risk som 
krävs. Att tala om risker vars existens är osäker (till skillnad från risker vars reali-
sering är osäker) såsom inom internationell miljörätt, är mindre lämpligt här, men 
domstolen har åtminstone accepterat väldigt svaga risker såsom tillräckliga för att 
kräva handling. 
Vid jämförandet av försiktighetsnormen i EKMR-systemet med försiktighetsprin-
cipen i internationell miljörätt, i avsnitt 4.1, argumenteras det för att försiktighets-
normen i själva verket är densamma i de båda disciplinerna och att den förutsätter 
uppfyllandet av samma villkor för att försiktighetsåtgärder ska krävas. Det som 
varierar är betydelsen av dessa villkor, beroende på de skilda sammanhangen. 
Dessa anpassningar ryms dock inom ramen för den proportionalitetsbedömning 
som måste göras. Detta är möjligt eftersom normen ger stort utrymme för diskret-
ionära bedömningar av stater och rättstillämpare som tillämpar den.  Proportional-
itetskravet innebär att normen inte kan reglera detaljer, utan bara ge riktlinjer. 
I det mer spekulativa avsnittet 4.2, anses det vara en indikation på att en allmän 
försiktighetsnorm är möjlig, att försiktighetsnormen är gemensam i internationell 
miljörätt och inom EKMR-regimen och att den motiveras av behovet av effektivt 
skydd av de aktuella intressena. En gemensam (eller allmän) norm utesluts inte av 
avsaknaden av en gemensam term, men användandet av en gemensam term skulle 
kunna främja den vidare utvecklingen av den gemensamma normen och kanske 
också inspirera till en tillämpning av normen även i andra folkrättsliga discipliner, 
eftersom gemensamma termer kan dra uppmärksamheten till kopplingar som an-
nars kan förbises. 
Slutligen konstateras att oaktat existensen av en gemensam försiktighetsnorm, så 
antyder utredningen att det kan finnas likheter mellan de olika folkrättsliga disci-
plinerna som kanske inte är uppenbara vid första anblick. Det skulle vara fördel-
aktigt för folkrätten i stort om sådana likheter identifierades, eftersom det skulle 
främja en bättre förståelse av folkrättens sanna natur och dess anspråk på att vara 
en enda rättsordning.  
8 
  
Abbreviations 
EC  European Community 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Humans and the environment are not the same. There are many obvious ways of 
distinguishing a human being from a lake, or a tree, or a bird, and these differ-
ences are indisputable. But at the same time, humans and the environment are also 
one. Humans are part of the complex ecosystem on earth where living organisms 
and their surroundings interact, together making a whole that is more than the sum 
of the individual parts. Yet modern human life seems to be a desperate struggle 
for distance to and in oblivion of human origin, and as if nature is but a group of 
trees mercifully left un-engulfed by the growing sites of civilisation. When cli-
mate change and environmental destruction now increasingly threaten human life 
and interests, the unsustainability of this illusion becomes evident. When pieces of 
the jigsaw are separated, the bigger picture is easily lost. 
This problem seems somewhat reflected in public international law. While public 
international law is referred to as the global legal order, its various disciplines 
sometimes seem quite separate or even independent and are often considered in 
isolation. It is not to be denied that there are differences between the various 
branches of public international law, but focusing on them may deepen a division 
between the disciplines. Such a division may have inherent dangers, in line with 
the separation of humans from the environment – the bigger picture may be lost. 
If the connections between the disciplines are indeed only few and weak, there 
may not be enough reason to claim that public international law is a single legal 
order. It is therefore important as well as interesting to investigate the features that 
are common to different disciplines of public international law and find the links 
that tie them together. It is important for the understanding of the nature of public 
international law – and its claim on the status of world legal order – to examine 
how the different disciplines relate to each other and influence each other and how 
general norms of public international law develop. Such abstract issues are best 
illustrated with concrete examples, however, which is where this thesis can be 
relevant. 
Like any other branches of public international law, international environmental 
law and international human rights law may differ and correspond in many ways 
which may be more or less obvious. As an example, one aspect that appears to be 
a difference between these two disciplines is the fact that there is a norm known 
as the precautionary principle in international environmental law. This term does 
not seem to be referred to in international human rights law. One might wonder if 
this is a difference in legal content as well as in terminology or if there are in fact 
similarities between the two disciplines in their relation to precaution. Such 
thoughts are the point of departure for this thesis. 
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1.2 Purpose, questions and delimitations 
The main question discussed in this thesis is whether or not there is a norm of 
precaution in the European Convention on Human Rights, the ECHR, similar to, 
or the same as, the precautionary principle in international environmental law. The 
purpose of this is to provide an example for future discussions on the interrela-
tionships between public international law in general and its many disciplines, 
especially international environmental law and international human rights law, 
and on the development of general norms of public international law. 
To fulfil this aim, the following questions are investigated. 
1. What is the essence of the precautionary principle in international environ-
mental law? 
2. Might there be, through the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, 
some kind of norm of precaution in the ECHR? 
3. Might there be a common norm of precaution in international environmental 
law and in the ECHR? 
4. Are there any indications of a general norm of precaution in public interna-
tional law? What may be the importance of terminology in this context? 
These questions largely set the structure of the thesis, and are further explained in 
section 1.4 below. 
In order to illustrate the interrelationships between different branches of public 
international law and provide a basis for discussions on the development of gen-
eral norms, a comparison of norms regarding a certain issue in different disci-
plines seems necessary. Finding that a certain norm exists in one branch may not 
have much relevance for public international law in general, unless similar norms 
can be found in other branches as well. Therefore, comparison is essential. The 
example chosen concerns precaution in international environmental law and in the 
ECHR. This choice is based partly on personal interest, but there are other reasons 
as well. Firstly, to provide a useful example, it is necessary to investigate a norm 
which is explicitly recognised in one (or a few) discipline(s) of public internation-
al law but not in others. This norm must also appear to have the potential of being 
relevant outside of the regime(s) where it evidently exists – i.e. it must relate to 
problems which do not appear unique for the regime at hand. The precautionary 
principle in international environmental law seems to have such potential. Hence, 
this is the starting point. 
Further, human rights law offers an interesting comparison with international en-
vironmental law since it is a discipline which at first glance appears very different. 
Despite this, precaution does not seem to be irrelevant for the protection of human 
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rights. Admittedly, the project could easily have been expanded to encompass 
other fields of public international law and/or international human rights law in 
general – and not just the ECHR. However, considering the limits posed by the 
timeframe and suitable extent of a graduate thesis that would have been ill-
advised. The ECHR is also particularly fit for a study of this kind since case law 
from the ECtHR is rich and accessible and a generous supply of information – 
preferably case law, which provides practical examples – would seem necessary 
in order to properly define any legal norm. It must be noted, obviously, that the 
focus on the ECHR means that any conclusions cannot automatically be assumed 
to apply to international human rights law in general. 
1.3 Terminology 
Before turning to other issues, a brief note must be made on a few terms used 
throughout this thesis, to clarify their different meaning. Throughout the thesis the 
precautionary principle is referred to as the relevant norm of international envi-
ronmental law. There are other names for this norm as well, which may, according 
to some, have slightly different meanings. This is further explained below, in sec-
tion 2.1. For the purposes of this thesis, these terms are considered interchangea-
ble – if nothing else is expressed – but it shall nevertheless be underscored that 
although the term precautionary principle is used here, this is not intended to im-
ply anything about the legal status of the norm. 
Further, the term norm is also used throughout this thesis in a way that is intended 
to be neutral. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the legal status of 
the precautionary principle or of any norm of precaution in the ECHR. While it is 
essential to the practical application of any legal norm to distinguish its legal sta-
tus and determine if it is binding or not, this thesis is only concerned with the sub-
stance and meaning of these norms. In short, whatever implications may normally 
adhere to the term principle and to the term norm, these terms will in this context 
be considered neutral. 
The significance of terms in shaping public international law shall not be underes-
timated, however. Questions related to terminology are discussed further in sec-
tion 4.2 below. It shall be noted that although section 4.2 is primarily concerned 
with discussing previously presented information, a brief explanation of some 
theory concerning terms is also presented. The purpose of this is not to add new 
information to analyse, but rather to shed light on some ideas which may be used 
for the analysis. 
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1.4 Method and materials 
It is explained in section 1.2 above that the thesis is based on the comparison be-
tween international environmental law and the ECHR regime. In other words, the 
method is comparative. On a more detailed level, the investigation is conducted 
through the examination of the precautionary principle in international environ-
mental law (question 1) on the one hand, and the approach to precaution in the 
ECHR regime (question 2) on the other hand. The findings in regard to each ques-
tion are then compared in order to assess the possibility of a common norm of 
precaution (question 3) and the results are finally used to discuss the possibility of 
a general norm of precaution in public international law and the importance of 
terms in that context (question 4). 
The main concern of this thesis – i.e. if there is a norm of precaution in the ECHR 
similar to the precautionary principle in international environmental law and how 
this question can exemplify more general issues – does not appear to have been 
the object of much previous research. However, many of the aspects that must be 
assessed in order to fulfil the aim of the thesis have previously been examined 
separately. Consequently, the four questions of this thesis must all be tackled in 
slightly different ways, depending on the materials available. A related matter is 
the fact that since the examinations of the two disciplines are based on different 
materials and require different methods, the sections do not have an identical 
structure. This is mostly indicated by the lack of correspondence between the 
headlines of the sub-sections in sections 2 (concerning international environmen-
tal law) and 3 (concerning the ECHR). While the method and structure differ, 
however, both sections have the same purpose – to explain the approach to pre-
caution in the discipline at hand. 
In international environmental law the precautionary principle is somewhat de-
fined, and it may therefore be examined through its use and interpretation in trea-
ties and other instruments, literature and case law. The examination is conducted 
in four steps. Initially, the historical background of the precautionary principle is 
presented, along with examples of how it has been defined in treaties and other 
international instruments, to give an introduction and basic understanding. The 
legal context of international environmental law relevant to the precautionary 
principle is then described, because in order to understand the norm itself, the 
other norms along which it operates cannot be ignored. The next step is the exam-
ination of the different elements of the precautionary principle, i.e. the aspects that 
must be considered when it is applied. Finally, some effects of the precautionary 
principle are assessed. This assessment is necessary to clarify the practical mean-
ing of the elements of the norm. 
Literature is central in regard to international environmental law – much due to 
the scarcity of other sources. International case law is notably scant, but plays a 
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part in explaining the effects of the precautionary principle. Some literature is 
worth mentioning specifically, notably International Law and the Environment, 
by Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell (Oxford University Press 
2009), Environmental Principles – From Political Slogans to Legal Rules, by Ni-
colas de Sadeleer (Oxford University Press 2002), Principles of International En-
vironmental Law, by Philippe Sands and Jaqueline Peel (Cambridge University 
Press 2012), and International Environmental Law, by Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo 
Marauhn (Hart Publishing 2011). 
Regarding precaution in the ECHR, another approach is necessary. The object of 
investigation must primarily be case law from the ECtHR, which is analysed in 
order to determine if the Court seems to rely on any norm that bears any likeness 
to the precautionary principle in international environmental law. To simplify the 
comparison, ECtHR practice is scrutinised using, as far as possible, the same 
terms and the same systematisation as are used to define the precautionary princi-
ple in international environmental law, in section 2.3. Before turning to case law 
however, some theory is required to explain how it is possible that a norm of pre-
caution could be applied by the ECtHR. No such norm is explicit in the ECHR, so 
its possible existence in the ECHR regime must be motivated with how the Con-
vention is interpreted and with the nature of state obligations. In regard to these 
initial issues, literature is of some importance, although it generally only plays a 
secondary part in the ECHR section. Worth mentioning are Harris, O’Boyle and 
Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, by Harris, D. J., 
O’Boyle, M., Bates, E. P. and Buckley, C. M. (Oxford University Press 2009) and 
Jacobs, White and Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights, by Rainey, 
Bernadette, Wicks, Elisabeth and Ovey, Clare (Oxford University Press 2014). 
For the examination of case law from the ECtHR, an inductive method is applied.
1
 
The only way of establishing with absolute certainty the existence and scope of 
any norm of precaution in the ECHR would undoubtedly be to scrutinise all case 
law from the ECtHR. To do that within the limited scope of a graduate thesis 
would, however, be impossible – especially considering the fact that the quest is 
to investigate if something exists, not to investigate the nature of a known and 
already defined norm. Consequently, the examination of the practice of the EC-
tHR in this thesis is not complete, and it can only and does only aim at providing a 
few relevant examples. This would have been a problem if the aim was to estab-
lish the precise contents of ECtHR case law, but that is not the function of the 
case law study in this thesis. Case law is only needed to provide a basis for dis-
cussion on what norm of precaution might emanate from the ECHR – it is needed 
for suggestions rather than proof. Accordingly, this thesis does not intend to prove 
the existence of any kind of norm of precaution in the ECHR regime, but it at-
                                                 
1
 On induction and logic, see e.g. Cohen (Carl), Copi and McMahon, inter alia pp. 24-27; Cohen 
(L. Jonathan), inter alia pp. 121-123. 
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tempts only at indicating the possible existence, or non-existence, of a norm of 
precaution of some kind. 
Having said that, it must be underlined that case law is not selected entirely at 
random. Focus is on cases from three different categories, which are further ex-
plained in sections 3.1 and 3.2 below. A few remarks will be made here as well, 
though. The different categories of cases concern: state obligations under Article 2 
of the ECHR to protect the right to life; state obligations under Article 3 of the 
ECHR to protect people from being subjected to ill-treatment (with focus on cases 
concerning the removal of aliens to other states); and state obligations under Arti-
cle 8 of the ECHR to protect the rights to private and family life etc., in situations 
with environmental aspects. Under the third category – and also partly the first – 
cases with environmental aspects are assessed. Such cases are interesting because 
they may highlight differences between the ECHR and international environmen-
tal law since the same kind of event may be assessed differently in each disci-
pline. Further, the use by the ECtHR of a norm similar to the precautionary prin-
ciple may be more likely, or more appropriate, in such cases than in others. The 
second category consists of cases concerning the removal of aliens to other states. 
In these cases the ECtHR must examine what risks a person might face if forced 
to return to a certain country. Thus, these assessments actually concern hypothet-
ical situations, and that would also seem to motivate the use of a norm similar to 
the precautionary principle. These cases, as well as the non-environmental cases 
under Article 2, also fill the function of contrasting against the environmental cas-
es. The reason for examining cases belonging to different categories is to gradual-
ly distinguish human rights law cases from cases of international environmental 
law. Cases from the ECtHR concerning environmental matters may concern the 
same kind of situations that would be relevant in international environmental law. 
If a norm of precaution is applied in such cases, it might then be further analo-
gised to other ECHR cases as well.  
In relation to ECtHR case law, it shall finally be observed that the ambition is to 
find as recent case law as possible, since newer cases may contradict previous 
ones as the Court develops its practice. The more recent cases will be assumed to 
best represent the view of the Court.
2
  There can, however, be no guarantees that 
all cases are found, as is explained above in regard to the inductive method. It is 
an ambition to give due regard to difficulties of this kind throughout the thesis. 
After turning to international environmental law in section 2 and the ECHR in 
section 3, section 4 is the final part, where the overarching questions are dis-
cussed. In order to examine the existence of a common norm of precaution in in-
ternational environmental law and the ECHR, the findings in regard to the ap-
proach to precaution in each regime are compared in section 4.1 – once again us-
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ing partly the same systematisation as is elaborated in regard to the precautionary 
principle in international environmental law in section 2.3. The method in section 
4.2, however, is slightly different. This section is of a rather speculative nature 
and the facts and conclusions of the previous sections are used here as the basis 
for a discussion on the possibility of a general norm of precaution and the role of 
terminology in relation to this. The aim is not to draw any definitive conclusions, 
but rather to consider the possibilities. 
1.5 Structure 
The first part of the thesis, section 2, is concerned with the precautionary principle 
in international environmental law, and aims at establishing the central ideas of 
this norm by examining its development and how it is defined in different interna-
tional legal instruments (section 2.1), how it relates to other norms of international 
environmental law (section 2.2), what elements it is composed of (section 2.3) and 
what effects it has (section 2.4). Next part, section 3, deals with the ECHR and 
focus there is on finding what norm of precaution may exist in this regime. After 
some explanation of the theoretical context, i.e. some basic features of the inter-
pretation of the ECHR (section 3.1) and the nature of state obligations (section 
3.2), case law is examined (section 3.3). The examination of case law is divided in 
three sub-sections – one for each category of cases. The results of the study of 
case law are analysed in section 3.4. Subsequently, in section 4, the previous sec-
tions are tied together, and the actual comparison between precaution in interna-
tional environmental law and precaution in the ECHR is made and the main ques-
tions are discussed – i.e. if there is a common norm and if there are indications of 
a general norm of precaution in public international law. Finally, the conclusions 
are considered in a larger context in section 5. Hence, the structure follows the 
order of the questions presented in section 1.2 above. The headlines also reflect 
this outline. It shall also be noted that throughout this thesis, no strict division is 
upheld between purely descriptive sections and purely analytical sections. Conse-
quently, the materials presented are commented along the way, but sections 2.3, 
2.4, 3.4 and 4 have a predominantly analytical character. The aim of the overall 
structure is promoting the legibility of the thesis and presenting the findings in the 
most intriguing way.  
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2 Precaution in international environmental 
law 
2.1 Background and definitions of the precautionary prin-
ciple 
The precautionary principle has been referred to as one of the most important 
norms of international environmental law – even as being worthy of a high-
ranking position among the Ten Commandments of international environmental 
law, if such a list existed.
3
 The exact meaning, legal status and even name of the 
norm are, however, far from written in stone. 
The antecedent of the precautionary principle originates from Swedish national 
legislation, where in the 1969 Environment Protection Act, risk of environmental 
hazard was sufficient for protective action from the authorities – or even a ban of 
the activity in question.
4
 The Nordic countries and other European states such as 
West Germany and Switzerland soon followed and during the 1980s these ideas 
grew stronger throughout Europe. The EU subsequently accepted the precaution-
ary principle as one of its central principles, through the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992.
5
 While the importance of the precautionary principle increased in Europe, 
the norm also gained influence in a wider international context – it was first re-
ferred to in various non-binding instruments, inter alia the UN World Charter for 
Nature in 1982 and in decisions by the North Sea Ministerial Conferences in 
1984, 1987, 1990 and 1995 regarding marine pollution.
6
 Eventually it was recog-
nised also in a general context of international environmental law, notably in the 
Declaration on Environment and Development, of the UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 – commonly known as the 
Rio Declaration. The definition in the Rio Declaration was based on a proposition 
from the EU, and is widely recognised and referred to – even as expressing the 
core of the precautionary principle.
7
 The Rio Declaration contains several non-
binding principles,
8
 and Principle 15 reads: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
                                                 
3
 Weiner, JB, ”Precaution”, in Bodansky, D. et. al. (editors), The Oxford Handbook of Internation-
al Environmental Law, Oxford 2007, pp. 597 and 599, quoted in Beyerlin and Marauhn, p. 47. 
4
 Beyerlin and Marauhn, p. 47. 
5
 Beyerlin and Marauhn, pp. 47-48; Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, p. 154; de Sadeleer, pp. 110 and 
137-138. 
6
 Beyerlin and Marauhn, pp. 48-49; de Sadeleer, pp. 94-97; Sands, pp. 217-219. 
7
 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, pp. 154-155 and 159; de Sadeleer, p. 97; Sands, p. 218. 
8
 de Sadeleer, p. 97. 
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shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.
9
 
This definition of the precautionary principle encompasses the main traits of the 
principle, which are: risk (threat), damage, uncertainty (lack of full scientific cer-
tainty) and proportionality (cost-effective measures). After the Rio Declaration, 
the precautionary principle has been included in several other instruments – both 
binding and non-binding.
10
 Some texts more or less recite the Rio Declaration,
11
 
but there are at least twelve different versions of the precautionary principle in 
different instruments.
12
 All of them cannot be reviewed here, but a few examples 
will be provided, to illustrate the variations. These examples are relevant for the 
more detailed definition of the different elements of the precautionary principle 
that is made in section 2.3 below. Before turning to the different instruments, 
however, a note on terminology is required. 
As evident in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, and as has been noted in section 
1.3, the terminology is somewhat confusing. While the Rio Declaration presents 
the norm as Principle 15, the text speaks of the precautionary approach. The use 
of the word approach was the result of US persistence, but is considered to be of 
little importance. The precautionary principle, the precautionary approach, pre-
cautionary action, precautionary measures, or simply precaution are all different 
labels used to describe what is generally the same thing.
13
 It has been argued that 
an approach might entail fewer restrictions and thus be more liberal.
14
 However, 
as is explained in section 1.3, the terms will for the most part of this thesis be con-
sidered interchangeable – indeed they appear to be the result of “a semantic 
squabble”,15 as Nicolas de Sadeleer so eloquently put it – in line with what many 
other scholars seem to think.
16
 The use of different terms to describe the norm 
may, however, have some implications. While some claim that the precautionary 
principle is customary international law,
17
 e.g. with a view to the fact that it has 
been widely recognised and included in many binding treaties, others find existing 
state practice insufficient, especially considering that the norm is defined and in-
terpreted in many different ways.
18
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to establish 
if or to what extent the precautionary principle is part of international customary 
law (see section 1.3 above), but admittedly, the examples from the various in-
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 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 
10
 See furhter e.g. de Sadeleer, pp. 97-100. 
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 See inter alia the preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the preamble to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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 de Sadeleer, p. 97. 
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 See e.g. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, p. 155. 
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 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, pp. 159-164; de Sadeleer, pp. 100 and 315-319. 
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struments presented below do exhibit certain differences. That being said, they 
also bear many likenesses and if the central meaning is the same, then the mere 
variation in terminology seems irrelevant. It shall be noted that, in any case, con-
cluding that the norm is not customary international law does not necessarily ren-
der it without influence. Customary international law is but one source of interna-
tional law,
19
 and the precautionary principle might yet be considered a general 
principle of law, and as such have impact on state practice, shape the contents of 
treaties and international case law and be a weighty argument in the legal de-
bate.
20
 In short, it may have political influence. 
As to the examples, an early version of the precautionary principle is provided by 
the 1991 Bamako Convention, which aims at ending the import of hazardous 
waste to Africa. The Convention prescribes that 
[e]ach Party shall strive to adopt and implement the preventive, precau-
tionary approach to pollution problems which entails, inter alia, preventing 
the release into the environment of substances which may cause harm to 
humans or the environment without waiting for scientific proof regarding 
such harm.
21
 
Despite the fact that the norm is referred to as the precautionary approach, this is 
by some considered to be one of the most far-reaching versions of the precaution-
ary principle, since its application is not limited to situations where damage is 
serious or irreversible – in contrast to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.22 Like-
wise, the 1992 UNECE Water Convention says nothing about the gravity of the 
potential damage either. Here, the norm is referred to as a principle to guide the 
parties in taking measures inter alia to reduce pollution of transboundary water 
and groundwater.
 23
 The relevant Article reads as follows: 
The precautionary principle, by virtue of which action to avoid the poten-
tial transboundary impact of the release of hazardous substances shall not 
be postponed on the ground that scientific research has not fully proved a 
causal link between those substances, on the one hand, and the potential 
transboundary impact, on the other hand.
24
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 See Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, further explained e.g. in 
Shaw, pp. 69-128. 
20
 Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, pp. 27-28, 36, 38 and 162-164. 
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 Article 4.3(f) of the Bamako Convention. 
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 Sands, p. 220. 
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 See further Introduction – About the UNECE Water Convention, last accessed 2015-03-04 at 
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A further example is found in the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which is to 
implement certain provisions of UNCLOS, regarding conservation and manage-
ment of fish stocks.
25
 The agreement deals with precaution in the following way: 
Application of the precautionary approach 
1. States shall apply the precautionary approach widely […] in order to 
protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine environment. 
2. States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable 
or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and man-
agement measures.
26
 
The provision goes on to list specific measures that must be taken, such as sharing 
information, applying guidelines, adopting catch limits etc. Some claim that this 
Article even creates a presumption for conservation.
27
 In any case, the Article 
seems to give quite detailed guidance regarding how to adhere to the precaution-
ary principle in a specific context – and that seems rather unusual. 
The 1996 London Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter of 29 December 1972 gives another 
interesting example; 
In implementing this Protocol, Contracting Parties shall apply a precau-
tionary approach to environmental protection from dumping of wastes or 
other matter whereby appropriate preventative measures are taken when 
there is reason to believe that wastes or other matter introduced into the 
marine environment are likely to cause harm even when there is no con-
clusive evidence to prove a causal relation between inputs and their ef-
fects.
28
 
It can be observed that both this definition and that in the UNECE Water Conven-
tion speak of lacking evidence to prove a causal link between certain substanc-
es/wastes and their possible impact on the environment. This aspect is further 
elaborated in sections 2.2 and 2.3. Another observation is that both the London 
Protocol and the following example, the 2000 Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, 
might be read as implying that states may take all measures required to prevent 
environmental risks. The precautionary principle would then be a “licence to 
act”29. There is, however, little indication that the principle would entail a duty to 
                                                 
25
 More information in The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/Background%20paper%20on%20UNFSA.pd
f, last accessed 2015-05-16. 
26
 Article 6 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. 
27
 de Sadeleer, pp. 95-96 with notes. 
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 Article 3(1) of the London Protocol. 
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 Beyerlin and Marauhn, p. 50. 
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take certain action.
30
 But more on that in section 2.4. Article 10(6) of the Carta-
gena Biosafety Protocol reads: 
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific infor-
mation and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects 
of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to 
human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as ap-
propriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism […] in 
order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
31
 
The various examples now presented show that the precautionary principle is rel-
evant in many contexts and that although its terminology may be adapted accord-
ingly, the basis appears to consist of the same features. This is further explored in 
section 2.3, but before examining the precautionary principle in detail, its legal 
context must be further investigated. 
2.2 The legal context of the precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle does not exist in a legal vacuum and, consequently, 
can neither be described nor understood without its surrounding context of other 
legal norms with which it interacts. Firstly, the existence of any kind of norm re-
quiring precautionary measures presupposes that the environment is in fact con-
sidered worthy of protection in the first place. Thus, the basis for the precaution-
ary principle is the no harm-rule, also known as the principle of prevention.
32
 This 
international obligation to protect the environment seems closely linked to the 
right of states to territorial integrity. In other words, it follows from the obligation 
to respect territorial integrity, that states must not cause damage to the environ-
ment (i.e. the territory) of other states.
33
 This was expressed in the Trail smelter 
arbitration case from 1941, concerning a dispute between Canada and the US over 
a Canadian smelter causing air pollution which spread across the border. The arbi-
tration tribunal established that “under the principles of international law, […] no 
State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to 
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by 
clear and convincing evidence”.34 The principle of prevention was later confirmed 
in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, where Principle 21 reads: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
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sources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibil-
ity to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.
35
 
This is also confirmed in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration and it evidently goes 
further than the Trail smelter case, given that it includes not only the environment 
of other states but also that outside of national jurisdiction, such as the high seas, 
the Antarctica, or even the atmosphere.
36
 
Based on these confirmations of the norm and of its widespread use and recogni-
tion, there seems to be wide agreement that the principle of prevention is a norm 
of customary international law.
37
 One example of its recognition is the ICJ adviso-
ry opinion, from 1996, on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.
38
 
The principle of prevention thus means that states must prevent environmental 
degradation and that they may be held responsible for failing to do so if they have 
not acted with due diligence. What constitutes due diligence is not clear, however, 
nor is the question of how grave the damage must be for a state to be liable – it is 
only clear that it must be more than a minimum. Consequently, a state causing 
harm while acting with due diligence cannot be held responsible, and nor can a 
state acting without due diligence if the damage caused is insignificant.
39
 
At first glance, the principle of prevention may seem similar to the precautionary 
principle, in that they both oblige states to act before damage has occurred, in or-
der to avert it. Indeed, a special rapporteur of the International Law Commission, 
ILC, considered in a report that “the precautionary principle was already included 
in the principles of prevention and prior authorization, and in the environmental 
impact assessment, and could not be divorced therefrom”.40 There seems to be a 
vital difference, however, in that the precautionary principle calls for action at an 
earlier stage, before risks can be clearly identified and proven. The principle of 
prevention prescribes action in situations where there is a proven link between 
cause and effect,
41
 i.e. where it is certain that a specific cause of action can lead to 
a risk for specific consequences. This is illustrated by the previously quoted pas-
sage from the Trail smelter case, where it was required that “the injury is estab-
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lished by clear and convincing evidence”.42 In contrast, the precautionary princi-
ple applies when science is not clear – where there is no certain link between 
cause and effect. Thus, the precautionary principle is concerned with situations 
where the very existence of a risk is unclear. Naturally, a risk of damage means 
that it is not clear whether or not damage will occur in a specific case, but an un-
certain risk in this context means that it is not certain that a risk is present at all.
43
 
As an example, this means that if it can be established that toxin X can cause 
damage to the environment, there is a certain risk of damage if it is released into 
the environment – i.e. it is certain that damage can occur, but not that it will occur. 
On the other hand, if it cannot be proven that toxin Y can cause damage to the 
environment, there is an uncertain risk that it may cause damage if it is released 
into the environment – i.e. it is uncertain if it is capable of causing any damage at 
all. As explained, it is in the latter case that the precautionary principle applies. 
This is explicit in several of the instruments presented in section 2.1 above. The 
London Protocol is perhaps the best example as it states that the precautionary 
principle shall be applied “even when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a 
causal relation between inputs and their effects”.44 
The difference between the principle of prevention and the precautionary principle 
reflects, according to de Sadeleer, the different stages of environmental protec-
tion. Originally, international environmental law was primarily concerned with 
reparation for damages already incurred. Later, the preventive principle brought 
about an anticipatory aspect, addressing situations where there is a risk of damage. 
The latest stage is thus the precautionary principle, which speaks of action when 
there might be a risk of damage.
45
 
While the aspect of appropriate time for action has thus evolved, so has the object 
of protection. Initially, international environmental law, as seen in the Trail smel-
ter case, was concerned with the protection of the environment of other states and 
thereby had an almost bilateral character. Through the Stockholm Declaration the 
scope was widened to encompass the environment outside national jurisdiction 
and instruments from the Rio Conference (although not the Rio Declaration itself) 
use the term common concern for global environmental issues, such as biological 
diversity and climate change.
46
 The question ultimately follows if states now also 
have an obligation to protect the environment within their own borders. After all, 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration calls for a wide application of the precaution-
ary principle.
47
 Indeed, some believe that the precautionary principle is the foun-
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dation of far-reaching environmental protection extending over and within state 
borders.
48
 That the precautionary principle should have such application is more 
likely if one endorses the belief that the principle of prevention is applicable to the 
national environment, even if damage has no effects outside state territory.
49
 
Some even argue that the domestic environment is of common concern because 
states must protect it in order to adhere to the principle of sustainable develop-
ment.
50
 
Requiring adherence to the precautionary principle within a strictly national con-
text may be at the fringes of what might today be generally accepted. What seems 
clear is that the precautionary principle at least ought to be applied by states in 
relation to damage threatening the environment of other states, due to the roots of 
the principle of prevention in the Trail smelter case. It also seems reasonable to 
expect that the precautionary principle may apply to the environment outside of 
state jurisdiction, with a view to trends indicating the consideration of the envi-
ronment as a common concern and thus widening the application of the principle 
of prevention. It shall be remembered, though, that the application of the precau-
tionary principle may be specifically provided for in different instruments, both in 
terms of the aspects of the environment that are affected – watercourses, the at-
mosphere, biodiversity etc. – and in terms of different jurisdictional areas. The 
question of territorial applicability fortunately does not require an answer for the 
comparison of the precautionary principle to any norm under the ECHR regime, 
since the ECHR has no other objects of protection than the persons under the ju-
risdiction of a state. 
A couple of other norms of international environmental law shall be briefly ex-
plained in relation to the precautionary principle. Firstly, it is worth noting that the 
precautionary principle is in its nature future-oriented, as it is about the avoidance 
of future damage. In international environmental law there is also a norm of inter-
generational equity, connected to the principle of sustainable development. In 
short, it means that the present generation must preserve the environment in a 
condition where it can equally benefit future generations – it should not be passed 
on to the next generation in a worse condition than it was received in. If future 
risks are to be avoided according to the precautionary principle (even if focus is 
on the near future), it seems evident that intergenerational equity will be promot-
ed.
51
 This may be of limited relevance to the ECHR, however, since the Conven-
tion is concerned with the protection of rights of individuals in specific cases – i.e. 
in the present time. 
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While the precautionary principle thus can advance goals of environmental policy, 
there are also norms of international environmental law that will promote the pre-
cautionary principle. One is the requirement that states make environmental im-
pact assessments, EIAs, before conducting certain activities which may harm the 
environment. These assessments are a tool for risk evaluation and thus for the 
application of the precautionary principle.
52
 The obligation to conduct EIAs has 
been considered part of international customary law,
53
 and a state may in fact not 
be able to prove that it has observed due diligence if an environmental impact 
assessment has not been made.
54
 Another factor which might affect the assess-
ment of whether or not a state has acted with due diligence is if the state has ful-
filled other obligations, such as the duty to inform other states about situations 
where transboundary harm is likely to occur.
55
 It is also worth noting that states 
may sometimes have an obligation to provide environmental information to indi-
viduals as well, e.g. according to the Aarhus Convention.
56
 
2.3 Elements of the precautionary principle 
There are several aspects of the precautionary principle which affect the results of 
its application and which must all be considered in order to fully understand the 
meaning of the principle. These aspects are explored below and as well as ex-
plaining the precautionary principle, they serve as a tool for analysing case law 
from the ECtHR, in section 3. It shall be noted that while this section is much in-
spired by the very instructive systematisation of the precautionary principle by 
Nicolas de Sadeleer,
57
 it also contains personal conclusions drawn from infor-
mation provided by other sources. The elements of the precautionary principle are 
illustrated by the terms marked in italics in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to pre-
vent environmental degradation.
58
 
Thus, a few words are said about risk (“threat”), damage and proportionality 
(“cost-effective measures”) and about how these aspects are all influenced by un-
certainty (“lack of full scientific certainty”). A note on intragenerational equity is 
also made (“applied by States according to their capabilities”). 
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Risk 
In this context risk refers to the probability that something will occur – the proba-
bility that certain measures or actions will lead to certain consequences.
59
 As is 
explained above, the precautionary principle applies to risks that are uncertain,
60
 
i.e. where a causal link between action and consequence has not been proven and 
the very existence of a risk is in question. Certain risks on the other hand, where a 
causal link has been established, fall under the scope of the principle of preven-
tion.
61
 But not all uncertain risks will call the precautionary principle into action, 
since taking measures to avoid even hypothetical risks would hardly be possible. 
Consequently, there seems to be agreement that the risk must reach more than a 
minimum level and that there must be some scientific indication of its possible 
realisation.
62
 Therefore, the requirement that uncertain risks are taken into account 
does not make science irrelevant – on the contrary, it entails the careful scrutiny 
even of less established science, since that might be enough to motivate preven-
tive measures.
63
 In the advisory opinion of the ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber 
on Responsibilities and Obligations in the Area, the scope of application of the 
precautionary principle was defined as: “where scientific evidence […] is insuffi-
cient but where there are plausible indications of potential risks”.64 The applica-
tion of the precautionary principle in situations of uncertainty is also what sepa-
rates it from the principle of prevention and thereby widens the scope of environ-
mental protection. In short, the application in situations of uncertainty seems to be 
the raison d’être of the precautionary principle. 
Having said that, it may be questioned if the distinction between certain and un-
certain risks is worth making. If the existence of a risk is uncertain, one could say 
that there is still a risk that a risk exists. And if there is a risk of a risk, it means 
that there is in fact still a risk that damage will occur – only a more tenuous risk. 
Thus, maintaining the distinction between the uncertainty of the existence of a risk 
and the uncertainty of the realisation of a risk is an unnecessary complication. It 
may have a function in theory, but in practice it must be almost impossible to up-
hold such a construction. Consequently, the claim of the special rapporteur of the 
ILC (referred to in section 2.2) that the precautionary principle cannot be separat-
ed from the principle of prevention seems reasonable. It is perhaps sufficient to 
say that the precautionary principle lowers the threshold so that states may have to 
act even in the face of more tenuous risks than previously. Exactly how tenuous 
those risks may be must be determined on a case by case basis. 
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Damage 
The result of a realised risk is here referred to as damage.
65
 Damage is thus what 
the precautionary principle seeks to avoid. But must all damage be avoided? Prin-
ciple 15 of the Rio Declaration only includes damage that is “serious or irreversi-
ble”, whereas other versions of the precautionary principle may set different 
thresholds – or none at all. Of the examples presented in section 2.1, only the Rio 
Declaration requires a certain level of damage, whereas other definitions specify 
the object of damage, e.g. “the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity”66, 
“humans or the environment”67 or speak of damage as “transboundary impact”68. 
This specificity may be explained with the fact that many instruments are con-
cerned with specific matters, such as biodiversity, whereas the Rio Declaration is 
general in its scope. And likewise, states may have been more reluctant to include 
a version of the precautionary principle with a broader scope in a general instru-
ment such as the Rio Declaration (although it is not binding). However, even if no 
threshold regarding damage is explicit in a given version of the principle, it seems 
evident that damage must at least be of some minimum magnitude to prompt ac-
tion.
69
 Not only is such a requirement justified with reference to proportionality, 
but it also seems appropriate with a view to the fact that the principle of preven-
tion is likewise limited, as explained in section 2.2.  The required severity of the 
damage will also be dependent on the risk. If the risk is quite small but the possi-
ble damage severe, precautionary measures may be motivated. Likewise if the 
damage is rather small, but its realisation is very likely.
70
 In fact, this balancing is 
all about making a proportionality assessment – but clearly, the elements are hard 
to consider separately. 
Proportionality 
It has already been noted that hypothetical risks and insignificant damage fall out-
side the scope of the precautionary principle – although the question of where to 
draw the line remains unanswered. The existence of these thresholds, however, 
can be explained with proportionality, since it would be too difficult to try to 
avoid all dangers to the environment that could possibly result from human activi-
ties. Inherent in this seems to be a consideration of how to best invest the availa-
ble resources – i.e. a third aspect to be weighed in the equation.71 Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration explicitly mentions cost-effective measures, and while the 
economic dimension seems hard to escape, not all versions of the precautionary 
principle refer to it. Other examples presented in section 2.1 simply refer to ap-
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propriate measures,
72
 which also seems to indicate the need for a proportionality 
assessment. From a critical point of view, one could argue that there are certain 
environmental goods which cannot be valued in economic terms and that such 
considerations would undermine the principle.
73
 However, if truly serious damage 
were possible, it could also easily be argued that given its grave nature, any meas-
ure would be cost-effective, since any cost would be reasonable. In any case, pro-
portionality seems to be an important aspect of the precautionary principle. 
Related to the issue of proportionality is that of intragenerational equity, relevant 
mainly to the issue of inequality between the developed and the developing world. 
This is inter alia expressed in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration as the require-
ment that states apply the precautionary approach according to their capabilities. 
This is an example of the idea of common but differentiated responsibility, mean-
ing that while all states are responsible for protecting the environment, account 
must be taken of the fact that the industrialised states often have contributed more 
to environmental problems and are also better equipped to fight environmental 
degradation. The idea is that equality not only requires equal treatment of equals, 
but also differential treatment of those who are not equal. Common but differenti-
ated responsibility is referred to in inter alia Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration but 
its legal status is unclear.
74
 As it is a norm of general application to international 
environmental law, however, it may be relevant to the precautionary principle, 
even if it is not part of it. If considerations of the developmental status of states 
are allowed, that adds yet another dimension to the proportionality assessment. It 
may be seen as part of the assessment of what is cost-effective, as the reasonable-
ness of certain costs may depend on the status of state economy. 
What is evident so far, is that the precautionary principle gives an outline of what 
factors to assess, but says little about how to assess them and when action can or 
must be taken and what should be done.
75
 The precautionary principle leaves open 
questions regarding when damage is significant enough to be considered, and 
when an uncertain risk is sufficiently indicated to be relevant at all. Even if some 
instruments require e.g. “serious” damage, such terms seem to be left undefined 
and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
76
 It is perhaps inevitable that a broad 
norm fails to give detailed guidance in specific situations, since it lies in the idea 
of proportionality that individual factors always must be considered. 
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2.4 Some effects of the precautionary principle 
The effects of the precautionary principle – i.e. the consequences of its application 
– are, like many other aspects concerning the norm, unclear. One question regards 
whether the precautionary principle allows or demands action to prevent damage 
to the environment. Initially, it must be observed that the precautionary principle 
may have different functions in different contexts, and that the norm may be given 
a specific interpretation and meaning in a specific treaty.
77
 In general, however, 
Beyerlin and Marauhn identify three possibilities. The first is that the precaution-
ary principle establishes that uncertainty regarding the existence of a risk is not, 
on its own, a sufficient reason for inaction. This can be exemplified through Prin-
ciple 15 of the Rio Declaration; “lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing […] measures”. The authors regard this interpretation 
as not adding much value to the existing legal framework, though.
78
 That may be 
true, but although other excuses for inaction may remain, the precautionary prin-
ciple at least seems to raise the expectations for environmental protection. 
The second alternative suggested by Beyerlin and Marauhn is that the precaution-
ary principle allows action in situations of uncertainty – perhaps even when such 
measures would otherwise be considered contrary to other obligations. And the 
third option means that the precautionary principle demands action. The authors, 
probably correctly, consider the third version too demanding to be considered 
generally acceptable,
79
 but both these alternatives assume that the precautionary 
principle would somehow have precedence over other norms, which might be 
problematic. Firstly, only jus cogens norms would have precedence over other 
norms,
80
 so the second and third alternatives could not be taken too far. Secondly, 
proportionality would also excuse inaction if the measures required would in-
fringe too much on other interests. The existence of other norms requiring states 
to act contrary to the precautionary principle in a specific situation is in fact an 
indication of the existence of such other interests. It would therefore be dispropor-
tionate if the principle would always demand states to take action, even in contra-
vention of other norms. But thirdly, and most importantly, there seems to be no 
need to consider the precautionary principle to be in conflict with other norms at 
all. Even when such conflicts exist, the primary way of solving them is by inter-
preting the norms in a way that gives effect to both of them. Shaw speaks of a 
“presumption against normative conflict”.81 If used in this sense, to reinterpret 
other norms, the precautionary principle could be a tool for the expansion of envi-
ronmental protection. This also seems to be the way in which the precautionary 
principle functions. 
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The function of the precautionary principle as a tool for the re-interpretation of 
other norms has been suggested in international case law. In the Pulp Mills case, 
the ICJ held that “a precautionary approach may be relevant in the interpretation 
and application of the provisions of”82 a treaty between the parties. Similarly, 
Judge Cançado Trindade, in a dissenting opinion in another case, wanted to inter-
pret a convention in the light of the precautionary principle.
83
 In the previously 
mentioned Responsibilities and Obligations in the Area, the Chamber took note of 
the statement of the ICJ in Pulp Mills and seemingly implied that the same might 
be true for environmental treaties in general. The Chamber referred to Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT, according to which any rule of international law applicable 
in the relationship between the parties, should be taken into account when inter-
preting a treaty.
84
 In the WTO Appellate Body EC Hormones case, the EC argued 
that the precautionary principle ought to guide the interpretation of an agreement 
the EC was accused of violating.
85
 The Appellate Body held, however, that the 
precautionary principle could not have precedence over other principles relevant 
to the interpretation of the agreement and that it did not override the relevant pro-
visions.
86
 This may not speak in favour of interpreting the precautionary principle 
as allowing states to act in contravention of other obligations, but it may be ques-
tioned if norms of interpretation could ever truly be in conflict with each other. 
Regardless of whether or not the precautionary principle is applied in an individu-
al case, it seems as if it has little use on its own, and that its main function is to 
guide the interpretation of other norms. Thus, obligations to protect the environ-
ment may be strengthened with reference to the precautionary principle. 
So, what does it mean to interpret other norms in the light of the precautionary 
principle? Most likely, it means that the burden of proof will be affected – that is 
what many hold as the main effect of the precautionary principle. This would 
mean that those wanting to perform an activity would have to show that it does 
not pose a risk to the environment – but generally only after the party opposing 
the activity has been able to indicate that there is at least a prima facie risk. If it 
does not shift the burden of proof, the precautionary principle might at least lower 
the standard of proof for the party opposing the allegedly harmful activity.
87
 
Sands et. al. seem to believe that an interpretation of the precautionary principle 
that shifts the burden of proof is gaining increasing support by state practice.
88
 
This is in accordance with the view of Judge Weeramantry, who in a dissenting 
opinion in an ICJ case also stated that the precautionary principle had evolved in 
international environmental law to address situations where evidence of potential 
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harm may be in the hands of the conductor of the activities in question, rather than 
in the hands of those seeking to prevent them.
89
 
In the Pulp Mills case, however, the ICJ was of a different opinion. Initially, the 
Court held that while the starting point was that the applicant had to substantiate 
their claims, this did not relieve the other party of their obligations to cooperate 
when necessary for the procurement of evidence.
90
 But the ICJ went on to say that 
“it does not follow that [a precautionary approach] operates as a reversal of the 
burden of proof”.91 The Court further dismissed the claims of one of the parties 
because “a clear relationship [had] not been established between the discharges”92 
from a disputed mill and the alleged consequences thereof. In his separate opin-
ion, Judge Greenwood held that while the reasoning of the Court regarding the 
placement of the burden of proof was correct, he believed that the standard of 
proof ought to have been lower – in this case as well as in other environmental 
cases.
93
 Similarly, in a dispute over a nuclear fuel plant, the claimant was found 
not to have demonstrated the alleged adverse effects to the environment.
94
 This 
was criticised in a dissenting opinion where one arbitrator argued, with reference 
to the precautionary principle, both for a shift of the burden of proof and a lower-
ing of the standard.
95
 Indeed, it seems hard to oppose that the precautionary prin-
ciple ought to have impact on the burden and/or standard of proof. Distinguishing 
the precautionary principle from the principle of prevention means accepting that 
an uncertain risk can be enough. This means de facto lowering the standard of 
proof. This means shifting the burden of proof to the other state, to justify its ac-
tions, when a prima facie risk of damage has been indicated. Courts depriving the 
precautionary principle of this effect are in fact depriving it of any possible effect. 
To summarise, perhaps one could say that when the conditions for the application 
of the precautionary principle are met, it creates a presumption that action should 
be taken in order to protect the environment and that states who remain inactive 
must find other justifications than scientific uncertainty. In short, the precaution-
ary principle could be phrased in the following way: 
If there are plausible indications of potential risks of damage to the environment, 
states are presumed to take precautionary measures, as proportionate, to prevent 
any damage that is not insignificant, even when there is no conclusive evidence to 
prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects.
96
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3 Precaution in the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
3.1 The interpretation of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights 
Before turning to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the EC-
tHR, to investigate how precaution is handled, a few observations must be made 
on some of the guidelines the Court applies when interpreting the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, the ECHR. This is necessary because no norm of pre-
caution is explicitly mentioned in the ECHR and therefore the only way that re-
quirements to take precautionary measures can exist under the ECHR regime is if 
the Convention is interpreted in a way that allows it. As is explained below, the 
guidelines for the interpretation of the Convention indeed seem to make the exist-
ence of a norm of precaution possible. 
Firstly, Article 32(1) of the ECHR establishes the role of the Court as interpreter 
and applier of the Convention, but it gives no guidance as to how this is to be un-
dertaken. Thus, the guidelines have been developed by the Court itself through its 
case law. When first elaborating on its principles of interpretation in Golder v. the 
UK, in 1975, the Court applied the VCLT, although it had not yet entered into 
force. The Court considered, however, that the relevant provisions of the VCLT 
represented customary international law.
97
 In the complex process of interpreta-
tion, the Court has not distinguished any principles as more important than others, 
but focus appears to be a teleological approach. Accordingly, the provisions of the 
ECHR shall be interpreted with a view to their object and purpose and with con-
sideration of their context as part of the Convention as a whole.
98
 In Saadi v. UK, 
the Court condensed its view on interpretation in the following way: 
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Court is required 
to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the words in their context 
and in the light of the object and purpose of the provision from which they 
are drawn […]. The Court must have regard to the fact that the context of 
the provision is a treaty for the effective protection of individual human 
rights and that the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in 
such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its 
various provisions […]. The Court must also take into account any rele-
vant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations be-
tween the Contracting Parties.
99
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With regard to the object and purpose – which shall be considered according to 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT – it is evident that the interpretation differs from that of 
other treaties because the ECHR confers rights upon individuals. The general 
rules of treaty interpretation are thus less relevant, since most treaties lack this 
dimension and are only concerned with the obligations of states towards each oth-
er, in a more strict sense.
100
 Other rules or principles of international law applica-
ble between the parties to the ECHR may however provide guidance to the inter-
pretation of the ECHR, according to the VCLT.
101
 Further, since the aim of the 
ECHR is the protection of human rights, there is no presumption to the effect that 
the Convention should be interpreted so as to restrict as much as possible the obli-
gations of states in order not to infringe on state sovereignty – instead it must be 
interpreted so as to render the rights effective.
102
 An example is the case of Airey 
v. Ireland, where Article 6(1) of the ECHR was interpreted so as to encompass a 
right to legal aid, as the right of access to court might otherwise be illusory.
103
 
Allegedly, this implies that the ECHR must also be interpreted in a way that takes 
into account changes of values in society. Consequently, the meaning of different 
terms – and rights – in the Convention cannot be considered static.104 E.g. the 
right of recognition of the gender identity of transsexuals has been found to be 
encompassed under Article 8 of the ECHR, though it may not have been intended 
at the drafting of the Convention.
105
 In numerous cases the Court has stated that 
the Convention is a living instrument that must be interpreted according to the 
present day conditions.
106
 According to some, this means that the ECHR must be 
given a progressive, evolutive, interpretation, which serves to expand and enhance 
the meaning of the rights. A balance must however be struck so that the Court 
does not exceed its mandate.
107
 Indeed, while rights may be re-interpreted, no new 
rights can be invented by the Court. The line between a new right and a re-
interpreted right is hard to draw and cannot be thoroughly explained in this con-
text. As an example, however, the right to marry in Article 12 cannot be interpret-
ed as to encompass a right to divorce, although such a right is commonly recog-
nised in many European states – that would mean creating a new right.108 
While it is the task of the ECtHR to interpret the Convention, this does not mean 
that there is no room for recognition of the differences between the state parties. 
The Court sometimes refers to the margin of appreciation, which is granted to 
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states when they are considered better equipped to judge the appropriateness of 
certain measures within the national context than the Court. This is mostly rele-
vant under Articles 8-11, which allow for the limitation of the relevant rights un-
der certain conditions. Accordingly, the margin of appreciation provides recogni-
tion and acceptance of some of the cultural and legal differences between the state 
parties to the Convention and correspondingly limits the power of the Court. It 
reflects the role of the Court in the protection of human rights as subsidiary to that 
of the states.
109
 The margin of appreciation is indeed referred to in some of the 
cases presented below. 
To sum up, it would be possible for the Court to apply the precautionary principle, 
with a view to the evolutive interpretation and to the regard that is to be given to 
applicable rules of international law. That presupposes, however, that the precau-
tionary principle is indeed part of public international law, which is not certain (as 
discussed above in section 2) unless it is included in a treaty between the parties. 
But regardless of what may be the general opinion of the legal status of the pre-
cautionary principle as independent of any specific treaty, nothing prevents the 
ECtHR from considering the precautionary principle to be binding and therefore 
referring to it. As noted in section 2.4 above (p. 29), it was the opinion of the IT-
LOS Seabed Disputes Chamber in the case concerning Responsibilities and Obli-
gations in the Area, that the precautionary principle could indeed be used for in-
terpretation of other treaties, with reference to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. As a 
norm of international environmental law, however, the precautionary principle 
would have limited influence, since the ECHR is not concerned with environmen-
tal protection, unless it coincides with the protection of human rights.
110
 But that 
is the first interesting question – if the precautionary principle in fact has been 
used to protect human rights, or if it could be. Even more interesting is perhaps if 
the precautionary principle might be incorporated and applied even in cases where 
the environment is not relevant – i.e. if it has influenced the ECHR enough to cre-
ate a “human rights version” of the precautionary principle. Such a development 
is possible and it is with a view to this that cases with environmental aspects are 
given specific attention in sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3 below. However, this possible 
influence may be more likely, or more easily accepted, if the Court already (per-
haps simultaneously) applies a similar mode of reasoning, regardless of the exist-
ence of the precautionary principle in international environmental law, simply 
because the nature of its cases require similar assessments in terms of risk etc. It 
may be argued that some kind of norm of precaution is necessary in order for the 
rights to be effective. Consequently, there are two perspectives from which a norm 
of precaution in the ECHR might be relevant – as connected to the precautionary 
principle in international environmental law and/or independent of it. That is the 
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reason for reviewing both cases with environmental aspects and cases without 
such features. Regarding the first category, case law under Article 8 is of special 
significance. To explain the case law that is to be examined, however, a note must 
also be made on the nature of state obligations under the ECHR. 
3.2 The nature of state obligations 
The basis for all state obligations under the ECHR is Article 1, which requires 
states to secure the rights in the Convention to everyone within their jurisdiction. 
What it means to secure a right varies with each provision and may entail various 
obligations. The most obvious duty is that states must not infringe the rights of 
individuals – e.g. states must not torture people and thus infringe their right to 
freedom from torture (Article 3). Obligations of this kind are what the Court refers 
to as negative obligations, since they do not require action on behalf of the state 
but only demands that states refrain from action.
111
 
There are some provisions, though, that explicitly demand action. Examples are 
the duty to protect the right to life by law (Article 2) and to provide courts etc. to 
guarantee the right to a fair trial (Article 6). Thus, the Convention also entails pos-
itive obligations.
112
 Positive obligations are often associated with economic, social 
and cultural rights, such as the right to education, and were long thought to be 
only exceptional under the ECHR, since the Convention is primarily concerned 
with civil and political rights. However, positive obligations are not only explicit 
in some ECHR provisions, but have also been recognised by the Court as implicit 
in practically all articles.
113
 An example is the previously mentioned case of Airey 
v. Ireland, where the positive obligation to provide legal aid was considered im-
plicit in Article 6(1).
114
 The positive obligations have frequently been motivated 
by their alleged necessity for the effectiveness of the right in question,
115
 and thus 
seem to be a natural consequence of the approach to interpretation taken by the 
Court, which is described in the previous section. It may be observed that the ex-
istence of positive obligations outside the field of economic, social and cultural 
rights is hardly remarkable, nor is the fact that such obligations can exist along-
side negative obligations. An example of this is provided by the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations, which in Article 22(1) lays down the (negative) 
obligation for a receiving state not to violate the diplomatic mission of another 
state. The provision then clarifies that the receiving state is under a “special duty” 
(positive obligation) to take measures to protect the mission against intrusion etc. 
by other actors than the state itself. 
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To complicate matters, positive obligations can be of different kinds. This is best 
explained with reference to what is known as the tripartite typology.
116
 According 
to this theory, state obligations in relation to human rights are obligations to re-
spect, protect and fulfil. Obligations to respect correspond to what the ECtHR 
refers to as negative obligations, but the positive obligations encompass both the 
duty to protect and the duty to fulfil. The Airey case is an example of the latter 
category – providing legal aid to fulfil the right of access to court. The require-
ment that states protect human rights, on the other hand, covers situations where 
the rights of individuals are threatened by the actions of other individuals (or other 
non-state actors). The state must then protect the rights of individuals by prevent-
ing such interference.
117
 Indeed, obligations to protect also exist under the 
ECHR.
118
 Legislation can be a means of protecting human rights, but in some 
cases even more specific action may be required – see section 3.3 below. 
Categorising obligations as negative or positive or as obligations to respect, pro-
tect or fulfil may have pedagogical purposes, but the distinctions are far from 
clear and the very existence of such a thing as negative obligations might be ques-
tioned.
119
 What is more certain is that cases concerning (positive) obligations to 
protect human rights from interferences by other parties than the state itself are of 
specific relevance to this thesis, since they involve risk assessments. If something 
is to be prevented, it must somehow be predicted and this is where a norm of pre-
caution could be relevant. Admittedly, there may be elements of risk assessment 
in cases that might be categorised as concerning obligations to respect or fulfil, 
but these may be less obvious. Thus, cases concerning state obligations to protect 
are the focus of section 3.3 below. Among these cases, it is relevant to look at 
cases that are related to environmental issues, as well as cases that are not (as ex-
plained above in section 3.1). To narrow the range of cases for investigation, fo-
cus is on the protection of life, under Article 2, and on the protection from torture 
or other prohibited treatment, under Article 3, since case law concerning these 
aspects is substantial. Another reason is the fact that, (without wishing to diminish 
the importance of other human rights), the loss of life or the subjection to torture 
are serious and irreversible infringements and this could make a norm of precau-
tion more necessary in relation to these provisions. In section 3.3.3, however, a 
few cases concerning protection under Article 8 are also examined. The primary 
interest is not to examine a third article, but rather to examine cases where protec-
tion of human rights coincides with the protection of the environment. 
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3.3 Case law from the European Court of Human Rights 
3.3.1 Protection of the right to life 
Even before the obligation to protect life under Article 2 was recognised by the 
Court, a case concerning future risks to life was decided – Tauira and 18 others v. 
France. The applicants claimed that a French decision to resume nuclear testing in 
French Polynesia threatened their right to life. They claimed to have been made ill 
by the tests previously carried out and feared worse consequences. The case thus 
concerned the possible future violation of the applicants’ rights. The application 
was dismissed, however, since the applicants could not be considered victims of a 
violation. It was observed that applicants in exceptional cases can be victims even 
if no violation has yet occurred, if they can “produce reasonable and convincing 
evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting [them] personally will occur; 
mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient in this respect”.120 In this regard the 
Commission
121
 did not consider it sufficient to refer to general risks pertaining to 
nuclear activity, since many activities give rise to risks. Something more concrete 
would be necessary. Nor did the Commission wish to rule on the scientific validi-
ty of certain reports referred to by the parties, especially since there was disa-
greement among scientists. With reference to Soering v. UK (see section 3.3.2 
below) it was held that the applicants would have had to have “an arguable and 
detailed claim that, owing to the authorities’ failure to take adequate precautions, 
the degree of probability that damage will occur is such that it may be deemed to 
be a violation, on condition that the consequences of the act complained of are not 
too remote”. 122  There seems to be an indirect requirement for precautionary 
measures in the indication that states may be considered to have breached their 
conventional obligations even before damage has occurred, if their lack of precau-
tion has led to a sufficient level of probability that damage (violation) will occur. 
What level of probability – in the terms of the precautionary principle, what level 
of risk – is required is not quite clear. Mere conjecture or suspicion is not enough 
though, so – just as under the precautionary principle – there seems to be a re-
quirement of a minimum level of risk. 
In L.C.B. v. UK,
123
 the Court first established the obligation to protect life – i.e. 
the obligation to “take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction”.124 This case also concerned nuclear tests – here performed by the 
UK in the 1950s and 1960s on Christmas Island. The applicant had suffered from 
leukaemia as a child, allegedly because her father had been exposed to radiation at 
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the testing site. She claimed that the state had violated Article 2, since her parents 
had not been informed about the risks and recommended to monitor her health 
more closely. The Court found that it was not clear that her father had indeed been 
exposed to dangerous levels of radiation and that even if he had, the state could 
not have been expected to advice the applicant’s parents, since it had not been 
established – neither at the relevant time nor at the time of the judgment – that 
there was a causal link between the exposure to radiation of individuals and the 
occurrence of leukaemia in their subsequently conceived children. Further, it was 
not certain that earlier medical attention would have alleviated the applicant’s 
situation.
125
 This seems to indicate a norm of precaution where an uncertain risk is 
not enough to require action – not even when the possible damage is as severe as 
death and when sufficient action may be of a rather limited nature, such as the 
provision of health information. Thus, the ECtHR would seem to require risks that 
are less tenuous than what might be tolerated under the precautionary principle in 
international environmental law. However, later practice may contradict this. 
A landmark case concerning protection of the right to life is Osman v. UK. In this 
case, a schoolteacher had become obsessed with one of his pupils and stared stalk-
ing him and his family, vandalising their home and threatening them. Eventually, 
the teacher shot and killed the pupil’s father and seriously injured the pupil him-
self. The Court first observed that apart from a general obligation to protect the 
right to life through criminal law provisions and law enforcement deterring people 
from killing others, Article 2 “may also imply in certain well-defined circum-
stances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational 
measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of 
another individual”.126 This obligation was specified so as to limit the responsibil-
ity of states to situations where “the authorities knew or ought to have known at 
the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified 
individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and [the authori-
ties] failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged rea-
sonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk”.127 This limitation was mo-
tivated by the need not to impose a disproportionate or impossible burden on 
states – with a view to “the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the 
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be 
made in terms of priorities and resources”128 and also considering the fact that the 
power of the police to prevent crimes cannot be unlimited but must respect due 
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process – i.e. operational measures may have to be restricted so as not to interfere 
with the rights protected under Articles 5 and 8.
129
 
Although the police had been informed by the school about their concerns for the 
Osman boy, there had been no suggestions that the lives of the boy or his family 
had been at risk and no evidence linking the teacher e.g. to incidents of vandalism 
to the family house. Further, a psychiatrist had not found the teacher unfit for 
work. Not even the fact that the teacher had made known to the police his inten-
tions of committing murder, was in the view of the Court enough to consider that 
the police knew or ought to have known about a real and immediate risk to the 
lives of the Osman family, since the threats had been cryptic. The Court conclud-
ed that since the police had, reasonably, not found any grounds to suspect the 
teacher to such a degree that they could have used powers that would actually 
have stopped him (e.g. arrest), they could not be blamed for not interfering.
130
 
While this case does not, like the L.C.B. case, call for a causal link between ac-
tion/inaction and the loss of life, it does state that the risk must be real and imme-
diate. That level was not considered reached. Against that position, it may be 
claimed that since a member of the Osman family was actually deprived of his 
life, the risk must have been real and immediate, though perhaps not known by the 
authorities. Another way of seeing things is that because of the unpredictability of 
human behaviour, there is always a risk that any person may be killed by another, 
but unless the risk is manifested in such a way that the authorities ought to have 
known about it, it cannot be considered real and immediate. The fact that the risk 
actually materialises does not mean that the risk must have been objectively iden-
tified as real and immediate before the incident, since even risks that are perceived 
as remote and unlikely may be realised. Not all events can be predicted. 
The requirement of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual 
has been confirmed in a number of cases, which also provide further guidance as 
to what constitutes such a risk. Several cases deal with risks emanating from the 
the human mind, which may be more or less unpredictable. In Opuz v. Turkey, the 
state should have taken measures to prevent a woman from being killed by her ex-
husband, since the authorities had known about her situation (inter alia she had 
been threatened and stabbed with a knife) and she had petitioned the prosecutor, 
stating that her life was in immediate danger. The Court observed that the authori-
ties had had several options for protective measures but had not done much more 
than taking statements, which was not enough.
131
 Likewise in Branko Tomašić 
and Others v. Croatia, the authorities had failed to act upon a real and immediate 
risk, when a man killed his wife and daughter after having repeatedly threatened 
to do so and having been imprisoned for the very reason of these threats. The au-
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thorities had thus identified the risk that he posed, but failed to take adequate 
measures, since he was released from prison without having been given psycho-
logical treatment, although such treatment had been deemed necessary by the au-
thorities.
132
 There are also cases where mentally ill persons under the care of the 
authorities have killed others or themselves. A known mental condition in combi-
nation with the higher degree of responsibility that follows when the state has 
people in its care, seem to make violations of Article 2 likely in such cases.
133
 
There are instances, however, where the conduct of those causing loss of life is 
simply too unpredictable to reasonably be prevented. Such was the situation in 
Keenan v. UK, where a psychiatric patient committed suicide despite having been 
closely monitored and deemed fit for release from isolation, and also in a case 
where a woman set herself on fire when the police came to evict her family from 
their illegal dwelling.
134
 The Court specifically noted in the latter case that “rea-
sonably speaking, self-immolation as a protest tactic does not constitute predicta-
ble or reasonable conduct in the context of eviction from an illegally occupied 
dwelling, even in a situation involving such a particularly vulnerable sector of the 
population as refugees and internally displaced persons.”135 
There are other cases where the risk to a person’s life emanates not directly from 
human behaviour, but from other factors such as accidents, medical conditions, or 
natural disasters. In several cases the Court has held that the authorities are 
obliged to provide necessary healthcare to people in custody, in order to protect 
their right to life. With a view to their vulnerable position, the authorities have a 
special obligation to protect people in detention. This places a heavier burden of 
proof on the authorities of showing that a person’s death is not imputable to the 
state. Further, in these cases it seems as if a real and immediate risk is not re-
quired. In Jasinskis v. Latvia, a deaf man died in custody after the police had put 
him in a sobering-up room, believing that his behaviour was due to intoxication 
rather than the severe head injury he had sustained after a fall – a fall which the 
police knew about. The policemen were incapable of understanding sign language 
but had removed the note pad used by the man to communicate. As a result, and 
despite the desperate attempts of the man to attract the attention of the officers by 
banging on his cell door, he was given no medical attention until almost seven 
hours had passed after the officers first discovered that he could not be awakened 
from his supposed sleep. In this case, the Court only set out to determine if the 
authorities knew or ought to have known about the danger to the man’s health, 
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and if they had acted with due diligence. The conclusion was that the state had 
failed to safeguard the life of the man.
136
 
The obligation to provide health care to persons in detention seems to be a con-
crete example of what precautionary measures to protect life might encompass in 
specific situations. The fact that the Court does not refer to a real and immediate 
risk of loss of life but instead to dangers to health, implies that the required level 
of risk does not have to be quite as high in these cases. It seems natural that when 
states have increased power over individuals (and indeed, better possibilities of 
monitoring them and identifying risks), they must also have increased responsibil-
ities. Thus, the expansion of the application of the requirement for precautionary 
measures to situations with lower levels of risk, seems to be compensated by the 
fact that states already have far-reaching powers and obligations in custodial sit-
uations. The question then follows, why a real and immediate risk was in fact re-
quired in the cases concerning mentally ill persons under the care of the authori-
ties, e.g. in Keenan v. UK. Perhaps the answer lies in the source of the threat to 
the persons’ lives. In these cases, death was caused by the actions of mentally ill 
persons – actions which may be impossible to predict, due to the fickleness of the 
human mind. To fully eliminate all such risks would be, if not impossible, very 
difficult. Consequently, only the real and immediate risks may reasonably be ex-
pected to be prevented. 
Yet, there are other cases where a real and immediate risk is actually required – 
cases in which this makes sense because they do not concern as limited situations 
as individuals in custody or other institutions, but where the source of the risk 
might actually be more predictable than the human mind. One – which is even 
more important since it has environmental aspects – is Öneryıldız v. Turkey, 
where a rubbish tip had exploded, due to lack of ventilation to prevent methane 
and other explosive gases from accumulating. The explosion killed some of the 
people living in shacks beside the tip. The Court referred to the positive obligation 
to protect life and observed that “this obligation must be construed as applying in 
the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be 
at stake, and a fortiori in the case of industrial activities, which by their very na-
ture are dangerous, such as the operation of waste-collection sites”.137 It seems 
here as if international environmental law may have had influence. No explicit 
reference to the precautionary principle was made, but when specifying the pre-
ventive measures that may be relevant, the Court referred inter alia to the fact that 
there is a right to information in relation to dangerous activities which has been 
recognised under Article 8 and which may also be relevant under Article 2 “par-
ticularly as this interpretation is supported by current developments in European 
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standards”.138 It appears as if the Court not only used international environmental 
law as a subsidiary means of interpretation, but that it also took an evolutive ap-
proach to interpretation, in taking account of developments in European stand-
ards. This willingness to be influenced by international environmental law seems 
to open up for the possibility of also taking account of the precautionary principle. 
In the Öneryıldız case, there was apparently no doubt that the risk was real and 
immediate and that the authorities did know about it – and failed to take the rea-
sonable measures which would have prevented the explosion.
139
 One might con-
sider that the risk was obviously real and immediate also in Budayeva and Others 
v. Russia, but in this case the Court did not use this expression at all, which is 
somewhat confusing. The case concerned a series of mudslides which had hit a 
small town, destroying buildings and killing a number of people. Mudslides had 
since long been a reoccurring phenomenon in the area and the risk for a particular-
ly difficult mudslide during the summer in question had been known. Neverthe-
less, the protective dam had not been repaired, nor had the inhabitants received 
sufficient information and warning.
140
 The Court referred to the fact that an im-
possible or disproportionate burden must not be placed on the state, with regard to 
preventive measures and noted that “[t]his consideration must be afforded even 
greater weight in the sphere of emergency relief in relation to a meteorological 
event, which is as such beyond human control, than in the sphere of dangerous 
activities of a man-made nature”.141 Further, the Court held that: 
In the sphere of emergency relief, where the State is directly involved in 
the protection of human lives through the mitigation of natural hazards, 
[the considerations previously mentioned] should apply in so far as the cir-
cumstances of a particular case point to the imminence of a natural hazard 
that had been clearly identifiable, and especially where it concerned a re-
curring calamity affecting a distinct area developed for human habitation 
or use […]. The scope of the positive obligations imputable to the State in 
the particular circumstances would depend on the origin of the threat and 
the extent to which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation.
142
 
This seems to mean that in order for a state to be liable for not protecting people 
from natural disasters, the event in question must have been imminent, clearly 
identifiable and possible to prevent. Perhaps then, the omission of real and imme-
diate is of little importance. In fact, the threshold set in this case may be consid-
ered even higher than if the risk had been required to be real and immediate. 
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One last case worthy of a comment is İlbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye Kemaloğlu v. 
Turkey, where once again, natural phenomena were important. In this case a 
schoolboy had died when attempting to walk home in a snow storm after the 
school had been closed early without the school bus operator being informed and 
thus being able to take the pupils home. The Court did refer to the Osman stand-
ard of a real and immediate risk, but also stated that in the relevant context “it 
cannot be considered as unreasonable to expect the school authorities to take basic 
precautions to minimise any potential risk and to protect the pupils”.143 This may 
imply that schools have very far-reaching responsibilities for children, since they 
are expected to minimise any potential risk (not just real and immediate risks, but 
potential risks!). This is in line with the increased responsibilities for persons in 
custody, who are also dependent on the authorities, and it also reflects the fact that 
children are more vulnerable than adults. However, the statement might simply 
mean that if the measures required to prevent a risk are truly basic and require 
practically no resources (such as informing the shuttle service), there is no reason 
not to expect such measures to be taken, even in the face of risks that are only 
potential. What seems to be clear is that there are many relevant factors, all of 
which must be considered in the proportionality assessment. 
3.3.2 Protection of the right not to be subjected to torture etc. 
Article 3 of the ECHR prescribes that no one shall be subjected to torture or other 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As well as Article 2, this entails 
not only an obligation for states not to treat people in such a way, but also an obli-
gation to prevent that they are subjected to such treatment by others. This is par-
ticularly evident in cases where the extradition or deportation of aliens to states 
where they may face such treatment, has been considered a violation of Article 3. 
It might be claimed that an obligation not to remove people from the state is a 
negative obligation, but it could also be phrased as a positive obligation to allow 
people to remain in the state. Whichever definition is more correct, the important 
fact remains that when deciding that a person must not be removed, a risk assess-
ment must be made. This is why these “removal cases” are the focus of this sec-
tion. There are also other situations where people must be protected from ill-
treatment by other actors than the state – a few of these cases are also briefly 
commented. 
The most important case in this field is that of Soering v. UK. Not only is this case 
central for the protection aspect of Article 3, but it has also been referred to in 
relation to other articles, notably Article 2, in Tauira and 18 others v. France 
mentioned in section 3.3.1 above. In Soering v. UK, a German national was to be 
extradited from the UK to the US, where he faced a capital murder charge. The 
applicant claimed that Article 3 would be violated if he was extradited to the US 
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(to the state of Virginia), since he would be exposed to the death row phenome-
non, if he was sentenced to death there.
144
 The Court began by establishing that, in 
line with the object and purpose of the ECHR, and with the necessity of interpret-
ing the rights so as to make them practical and effective and considering the fun-
damental values expressed in the absolute right not to be subjected to torture etc., 
there had to be in Article 3 an inherent obligation not to extradite persons in cer-
tain situations.
145
 The Court seems to have relied on some kind of norm of precau-
tion in stating the following: 
It is not normally for the Convention institutions to pronounce on the ex-
istence or otherwise of potential violations of the Convention. However, 
where an applicant claims that a decision to extradite him would, if im-
plemented, be contrary to Article 3 […] by reason of its foreseeable conse-
quences in the requesting country, a departure from this principle is neces-
sary, in view of the serious and irreparable nature of the alleged suffering 
risked, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguard provided by 
that Article […] [T]he decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugi-
tive may […] engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, 
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting coun-
try.
146
 
In assessing whether the applicant faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Arti-
cle 3, the Court took account of the fact that he had admitted killing the two peo-
ple whose murders he was charged with and that he was likely to be convicted. 
The Court also examined Virginia law, from which it concluded that the death 
penalty was likely to be imposed in a case such as the one at hand. A relevant fac-
tor was also the impossibility for the Virginia authorities to, upon request from the 
UK, give any guarantees that the death penalty would not be imposed. After find-
ing that the psychological stress caused by the conditions at death row was suffi-
cient to constitute treatment contrary to Article 3, the Court thus concluded that 
the extradition of the applicant would constitute a violation of Article 3.
147
 
The Court thus motivated the precautionary need not to extradite people in the 
face of a real risk of torture etc. with the seriousness and irreparability of the dam-
age as well as with the need to make the protection offered by Article 3 effective. 
Precautionary measures (i.e. non-removal) are required, according to this case, 
when there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of prohib-
ited treatment. In the numerous cases following in the footsteps of Soering, there 
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are many other examples which clarify what the requirement of a real risk means. 
One is Vilvarajah and Others v. UK, where the applicants, who were Tamils from 
Sri Lanka, claimed to be at risk of ill-treatment from the authorities due to their 
associations with the liberation movement. The Court observed that any member 
of the Tamil community might previously have been at real risk of ill-treatment 
due to the intensive violence directed at the group by the government, but since 
the situation had improved and many Tamils had returned voluntarily, the “mere 
possibility of ill-treatment”148 was not enough.149 The Court held that “there exist-
ed no special distinguishing features in their cases that could or ought to have en-
abled [the UK authorities] to foresee that they would be treated in this way”.150 
A further example is provided by Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden, where a Nige-
rian woman claimed that she and her daughter would be at risk of female genital 
mutilation if forced to return to Nigeria. When applying for asylum in Sweden, 
the mother had given contradictory accounts as to whether or not she had in fact 
already been subjected to this practice and she also claimed that it was much more 
wide-spread than what was indicated inter alia by reports of NGOs. The Court 
noted that while it would often be necessary to grant asylum seekers the benefit of 
doubt in assessing their statements, due to their difficult situation, an asylum-
seeker would have to give a satisfactory explanation to discrepancies in their ac-
count. In this case, the applicants had failed to substantiate the allegation that they 
would face a real and concrete risk of female genital mutilation. 
While the requirement of a real risk may seem high, there are cases where the 
Court has found a violation of Article 3, despite a seemingly more tenuous risk 
than in Soering, for instance. E.g. in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, it was con-
sidered a violation to send refugees from Italy to Libya, because they would there 
risk being sent back to Eritrea and Somalia where they would in turn run a risk of 
ill-treatment.
151
 This is in fact a risk of a risk of damage. It might well be that the 
evidence is quite strong in an individual case, but in general it would seem as if 
such a “two step risk” would be more uncertain than a simple risk of ill-treatment. 
E.g. if there is an 80 per cent risk of being ill-treated in state X, and an 80 per cent 
risk of being sent to state X from state Y, the total risk of ill-treatment would only 
be 64 per cent. Thus, adding a link in the chain of risks will weaken it – although 
it may be strong enough in an individual case. When also accepting these “two 
step risks” as real, it would consequently seem as if the Court somewhat lowered 
the threshold for what may be considered a real risk. 
In most of the cases examined above, the risk assessments were made before the 
applicants had been removed from the state. This differentiates these cases from 
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those concerning risk assessment under Article 2, where the possible violation 
often lies in the past. There are, however, also cases under Article 3 where the 
situation is examined retrospectively. In these cases an important aspect is – as in 
the cases under Article 2 – what the state knew or ought to have known about the 
risk before the removal of the person to the other state. In Vilvarajah and Others 
v. UK the Court summarised its view on what to consider in the assessment of the 
risk of ill-treatment in three main points. The first was that the issue must be ex-
amined in light of all the material placed before the Court or, if necessary, ob-
tained by the Court itself. The second was that the risk must be assessed primarily 
based on what was known or ought to have been known to the state at the time of 
the removal of the person, but that information revealed later could also be con-
sidered, since it could confirm or rebut the risk assessment of the state. The third 
point was that the ill-treatment must reach a minimum level of severity in order to 
constitute a violation of Article 3. These three points appear to be generally appli-
cable, except that in the case of a pending removal, the Court will examine the 
present situation.
152
 
A factor that may be of importance to the risk assessment is whether or not the 
state has received from the state requesting an extradition any guarantees that ill-
treatment will not occur. Such a guarantee may not eliminate the risk of ill-
treatment, though, since it may be inadequate or be contradicted by other evi-
dence.
153
 Harris et. al. appear critical of the fact that the Court seems to be more 
apt to find that no violation has occurred in retrospective cases where assurances 
have been given, than otherwise.
154
 True or not, it would appear harder to assess 
what the state knew or ought to have known in a retrospective case, when the ill-
treatment is already a fact. But if the Court is indeed more willing to identify a 
violation before the event has occurred than after, it might be because damage 
may then be prevented. In that sense, the Court might indeed apply a norm of pre-
caution. 
When there is a real risk for ill-treatment in the receiving state, the Court has 
made it clear that there is an absolute obligation not to extradite or deport the per-
son. In Chahal v. UK, the Court had found that an Indian man supporting the Sikh 
separatist movement would face a real risk of ill-treatment if removed to India. 
The government argued that he posed a threat to national security in the UK and 
that the UK interest in having him deported would outweigh his interest not to be 
subjected to a risk of ill-treatment. This, the Court did not accept.
155
 Similarly, in 
Saadi v. Italy, the state claimed that the applicant supported fundamentalist Islam-
ist groups involved in terrorism, and that he was therefore a threat to national se-
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curity. The Court explained that since the right not to be subjected to treatment 
contrary to Article 3 is absolute and without exceptions, the conduct of the person 
in question is not relevant. The risk of ill-treatment for the person concerned can-
not be affected by any alleged threat that they may pose to national security in the 
state if not removed. Evidence either indicates a real risk of ill-treatment, or it 
does not.
156
 
Despite this, there are cases where considerations of priorities and resources are 
relevant (as they were in the Osman case, where the Court considered that the 
burden on the state would be too heavy if regard was not given to the fact that the 
police has limited resources). In D. v. UK, a man from St Kitts had been convicted 
of a crime in the UK and after serving his sentence was to be sent back to his 
home state. By then, however, the applicant was in the advanced stages of AIDS 
and claimed that it would be contrary to Article 3 to send him back as he could 
not be given appropriate treatment and would have no friends or family in St Kitts 
to support him. The Court noted that the lack of effective treatment in combina-
tion with his social situation would expose the applicant to a real risk of severe 
physical and psychological suffering and that in such “very exceptional circum-
stances and given the compelling humanitarian considerations”157 to be made, his 
deportation would constitute a violation of Article 3.
158
 The Court further stressed 
the exceptional nature of this case in the similar N. v. UK. After giving account of 
several other cases where similar claims had been dismissed, the Court held that 
the differences in the level and availability of treatments for certain diseases may 
vary significantly between states,
159
 but that “Article 3 does not place an obliga-
tion on the Contracting State to alleviate such disparities through the provision of 
free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its juris-
diction. A finding to the contrary would place too great a burden on the Contract-
ing States”.160 The Court thus seems to take a more restrictive approach when the 
non-removal of persons from a state would entail too substantial financial impli-
cations.
161
 One might question why the obligation not to remove severely ill per-
sons would be considered more burdensome than the continual hosting of any 
other persons, who may cause expenses in many ways. It seems evident, however, 
that economic aspects are not irrelevant to the proportionality assessment. 
It shall be noted that the obligation to protect people from treatment contrary to 
Article 3 has been recognised also outside the field of extradition and deportation 
of non-nationals. These cases appear to be predominantly retrospective, like most 
cases under Article 2, and have concerned e.g. children abused by their parents. In 
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Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, a man had been abused and eventually killed by un-
known persons – allegedly because he, as a doctor, had given medical care to 
wounded members of the PKK. The Court held – with reference to the Osman 
case – that since states must ensure that individuals are not subjected to treatment 
contrary to Article 3, they may be responsible either if the legal framework pro-
vides inefficient protection, or if “the authorities fail to take reasonable steps to 
avoid a risk of ill-treatment about which they knew or ought to have known”.162 
This seems to be essentially the same obligation as in relation to Article 2 and the 
removal cases under Article 3, with the difference that the risk is not required to 
be neither real nor immediate – if this difference in terminology actually mat-
ters.
163
 It can further be noted that the obligation to protect persons from ill-
treatment applies “in particular, [to] children and other vulnerable persons”.164 
3.3.3 Article 8 and the environment 
Article 8(1) of the ECHR establishes a right to respect for private and family life, 
home and correspondence. This right is not absolute like Article 3, however, but 
may be limited under the circumstances described in Article 8(2), i.e. “in accord-
ance with the law and [when] necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. A few cases are considered be-
low, in which threats to the environment have been claimed to also threaten peo-
ple and their rights under Article 8. These cases (at least one of them) strongly 
indicate a norm of precaution – more so than the environmental cases referred to 
under Article 2, despite the possibility for exceptions offered by Article 8(2). 
In the case of Guerra and Others v. Italy of 1998, the applicants complained of a 
factory in the vicinity of the small town where they lived, which had emitted poi-
sonous fumes when it was operating. The factory had posed a known risk – the 
authorities had classified it as high risk facility – and people had previously been 
poisoned by its emissions.
165
 The Court observed that there are positive obliga-
tions inherent in the obligation to respect private and family life and that its task 
would be to determine if the authorities had taken “the necessary steps to ensure 
effective protection”166 of the applicants’ rights. The Court referred to the fact that 
the risks were known and the fact that severe pollution could affect individuals’ 
well-being and prevent them from enjoying their rights guaranteed by Article 8. 
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Since the applicants had not been given any information that could have helped 
them to assess the risks posed to their rights by the factory, the state had not ful-
filled its obligation to secure the applicants’ rights.167 Implicit in the reasoning of 
the Court seems to be the idea that an obligation to take some sort of preventive 
action is necessary in order for the rights to be effective. In this case, when the 
risk was known, information about it should have been provided – as a precaution. 
This indicates that failure to provide information about risks can support the view 
that the state has not acted with due diligence – just as it may do under the precau-
tionary principle in international environmental law (see section 2.2). 
Pollution was also the issue in Fadeyeva v. Russia, from 2005. A woman com-
plained that pollution from a factory she had been living close to had violated her 
rights under Article 8. Inter alia she had become ill, but despite the known dangers 
the authorities had not allowed her to be re-housed to an area less exposed to pol-
lution. The Court noted firstly that environmental pollution must reach a certain 
minimum level in order to fall under the scope of Article 8 and in assessing the 
seriousness of the infringement all circumstances of the case would be relevant.
168
 
After having stated that the Court normally applies a standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt, it noted that flexibility had often been allowed – taking into 
account the nature of the right at stake and difficulties in the procurement of evi-
dence which may exist. Since only the government may be in possession of cer-
tain information, the burden cannot be entirely placed on the applicant to prove 
their claim.
169
 In the instant case, the Court found that since the pollution had ex-
ceeded the allowed level, it would be potentially harmful to human health. Alt-
hough that presumption might not be true in all cases, the Court found that the 
indirect evidence and presumptions made possible a conclusion that the appli-
cant’s health had deteriorated because of the pollution and that the infringement of 
her rights thus reached the level sufficient to be considered under Article 8.
170
 The 
Court concluded that the state had been in a position to evaluate the pollution and 
take measures to prevent or reduce it but that the authorities had not acted with 
due diligence since it had had many options for protecting the applicant’s rights 
(re-housing, pollution reduction etc.) but failed to do so. Thus, Article 8 had been 
violated.
171
 This case seems to indicate a willingness of the Court to lower the 
standard of proof in cases where evidence is difficult to find, and recognition of 
the fact that the effects of environmental pollution may be such a case. Lowering 
the standard and thus “helping” the applicant to reach the minimum level of inter-
ference required, seems to imply ideas very similar to the precautionary principle 
in international environmental law. 
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The last case that is examined here, however, takes the implications from the pre-
vious cases to a new level. In the case of Tătar v. Romania from 2009 – after all 
other environmental cases referred to in this section and in section 3.3.1 had been 
decided – the Court not only explicitly referred to the precautionary principle, but 
it appears to have been influenced by the precautionary principle in its approach 
and findings. In 1999 a mining company had been given permission to extract 
gold and silver at a site close to Baia Mare, where the applicants lived. In 1993 an 
environmental impact assessment had been made, according to which the mining 
would not have a significant effect on the characteristics of the region. The area 
was described as already polluted, which would seem to have influenced the con-
clusion, because there were actual doubts expressed as to the effects on the envi-
ronment of the method for extraction that was to be used – one employing sodium 
cyanide. The 1993 assessment acknowledged the risk of pollution of water in case 
of an accident, after which mists containing cyanide (a substance that can have an 
irritating effect on the respiratory organs) could spread over populated areas via 
the rivers. Already in January 2000, large quantities of cyanide polluted water 
leaked into nearby rivers and spread over large areas, poisoning aquatic life and 
emitting poisonous fumes. The applicants claimed that their rights under Article 8 
had been violated, inter alia because the asthma of one of the applicants had been 
worsened by the pollution caused by the accident.
172
 
The Court began by noting that pollution can affect the well-being of individuals 
and prevent the enjoyment of their rights to private and family life. The positive 
obligations mean that states must take all reasonable measures to protect the rights 
under Article 8 – inter alia by ensuring that decision processes take account of 
relevant information in order to predict and evaluate the possible consequences 
for the environment and for the rights of individuals so that a fair balance can be 
struck between the competing interests.
173
 Turning to the facts of the case the 
Court noted that, unlike in other cases, there were no official documents that 
could indicate in a sufficiently clear manner the danger posed by the activity to 
human health and to the environment. The Court concluded, however, that based 
on inter alia a UN report and the information provided by the applicants, the pol-
lution caused by the extraction had been capable of affecting the applicants’ well-
being and prevent them from enjoying their rights under Article 8. It was pointed 
out, though, that any presumed danger for pollution could always be definitively 
rebutted by the government, by an environmental impact assessment.
174
 Already 
at this point in the judgment, it seems as if the Court was willing to lower the 
standard of proof – or even reverse it – in favour of the applicants and accept the 
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applicability of Article 8 despite a lack of sufficiently clear evidence of the dan-
gerousness of the activity in question.
175
 
Although one of the applicants evidently suffered from asthma, although sodium 
cyanide is a toxin dangerous to human health and although the levels of pollution 
had been high near the applicants’ home after the accident, the cause of the aggra-
vation of the illness could not be proven. The Court held that “the applicants have 
not succeeded in proving the existence of a sufficiently established causal link 
between the exposure to certain doses of sodium cyanide and the aggravation of 
the asthma”.176 Despite this lack of a causal link, the Court claimed that the state 
had in fact had a positive obligation to protect the applicants’ rights. It said: 
despite the absence of a causal probability in this case, the existence of a 
serious and substantial risk to the health and to the well-being of the appli-
cants presses on the State the positive obligation to adopt reasonable and 
adequate measures capable of protecting the rights of the parties in respect 
of their private life and their home and, more generally, the enjoyment of a 
healthy and protected environment.
177
 
In this case, the authorities would have had to observe this positive obligation 
already before the accident and while an environmental impact assessment had 
been made in 1993, and while the Court admitted that states must have a wide 
margin of appreciation in this kind of cases, the Court observed that the technolo-
gy was new and its environmental consequences unknown. The only measures 
required would have been those in the power of the authorities which were rea-
sonably capable of preventing the risks that had come to their knowledge.
178
 The 
Court went on to refer to the precautionary principle and then observed that ac-
cording to its files, the Romanian authorities had not even discussed the risks, 
which in this case had been foreseeable.
179
 In conclusion, the Court found that the 
authorities had failed in their obligation to evaluate in a satisfactory manner the 
possible risks of the activity in question and to take adequate measures capable of 
protecting the applicants’ rights. Among these positive obligations, the Court 
stressed the importance of giving the public access to information permitting them 
to evaluate the risks themselves. But no such information had been provided in 
this case. Indeed, the activities had been allowed to continue even after the acci-
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dent in 2000, using the same technology. In this regard, the Court recalled “the 
importance of the precautionary principle”180 and held that the positive obligations 
had been applicable a fortiori after the accident. After the accident the inhabitants 
of Baia Mare had lived in a state of anxiety and uncertainty, worsened by the pas-
sivity of the authorities. The state had therefore violated Article 8.
181
 Thus, if not 
before, then through this case, a norm of precaution appears to be relevant to the 
rights in the ECHR. This norm will now be more closely examined. 
3.4 The norm of precaution 
After examining case law it seems evident that there is indeed some sort of norm 
of precaution in the ECHR. The question now remains as to its closer meaning 
and definition. In discussing this, the natural starting point is the precautionary 
principle in international environmental law, and to simplify a comparison, the 
ECHR norm is described, as far as possible, with the same terms and systematisa-
tion. 
In Tătar v. Romania the Court explicitly referred to the precautionary principle in 
international environmental law, and used it to support its finding that the state 
had not fulfilled its positive obligation to protect the applicants’ rights under Arti-
cle 8. This clarifies that the precautionary principle in international environmental 
law can actually be imported into the ECHR and be used to promote protection of 
human rights. It shows that while the ECHR does not protect the environment as 
such, norms of international environmental law may be applied in human rights 
cases when the measures necessary for the protection of human rights coincide 
with the measures necessary for the protection of the environment. Indeed, it 
seems hard to motivate why the standards of precaution would differ in such sit-
uations depending on whether they were scrutinised under international environ-
mental law or under human rights law, when the measures required are the same. 
Requiring less by the state under the ECHR regime would make no sense, since 
adopting the standard of the precautionary principle would not add to the respon-
sibilities already undertaken by the state. Apart from this general unreasonable-
ness, it would also be hard to motivate different standards when considering Arti-
cle 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, which requires the taking into account of other norms 
of international law applicable between the parties, when interpreting a treaty. The 
function that the precautionary principle has in the Tătar case is not one that en-
tirely revolutionises the approach to precaution taken by the Court, however. In-
stead, it rather confirms practices that appear to have evolved over a long period 
of time, independently of the developments in international environmental law, 
motivated by the need to ensure that the ECHR rights are effective in practice. In 
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section 3.1 above it is noted that there are two possible ways in which a norm of 
precaution may become relevant in the ECHR – through influence from the pre-
cautionary principle in international environmental law and independently of it, 
because of the need for the rights to be effective. The Tătar case shows that both 
ways are relevant, but the reference to the precautionary principle in international 
environmental law mainly serves to highlight the common features of the two 
legal fields and simply draws attention to the norm of precaution that the Court 
since long applies. 
In the case law examined above, precautionary ideas are present in many cases 
decided long before the Tătar case and without environmental aspects. The es-
sence of all these cases is that in order to secure the rights in the ECHR, states 
must protect them from being violated by other actors or forces of nature. To do 
so, states must take reasonable measures to prevent risks of such violations that 
they know or ought to know about. The more precise conditions of this obligation 
are discussed below using the same systematisation as is used in section 2.3 above 
in regard to the precautionary principle. 
Risk 
The exact level of risk that is required in order for the precautionary obligation to 
apply is a difficult to identify. Starting with the easy bit, it seems clear that there is 
a minimum level, below which states will not be obliged to act. In Tauira and 18 
others v. France it was made clear that “mere suspicion or conjecture is insuffi-
cient” and in Vilvarajah and Others v. UK, that the “mere possibility” of ill-
treatment is not enough. A minimum level of risk is also required under the pre-
cautionary principle in international environmental law. According to the precau-
tionary principle, however, an uncertain risk can be enough to warrant action – a 
causal link does not have to be proven. But under the ECHR, it is less clear that an 
uncertain risk can be accepted as sufficient in order to oblige states to act. In 
L.C.B. v. UK, the applicant had failed to establish a causal link – an expression 
which undoubtedly indicates that an uncertain risk would not be enough. But that 
such a standard would be prevailing is contradicted by several other things. 
The first reason why a causal link could not always be required is that if the re-
quirement was for a certain risk (an established causal link) in all cases it would 
make no sense to point out that mere conjectures etc. are not enough. Such obser-
vations are only relevant if the Court means that, “yes, uncertain risks may actual-
ly be enough, but they must not be that uncertain”. Further, in most other cases 
the risk is required to be real and immediate (under Article 2) or just real (under 
Article 3). By the sound of it, this is a higher threshold than the uncertain exist-
ence of a risk, which can be enough under the precautionary principle in interna-
tional environmental law. It might be argued that the requirement for a real (and 
immediate) risk means not only that the existence of a risk must be certain – i.e. 
that there must be a causal link between input and effect – but that there must also 
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be a real and immediate probability that this risk will be realised in the particular 
case – i.e. that the risk of damage must reach a specific level of strength. But on 
the other hand, it could also be claimed that a real and immediate risk is more 
potent than an uncertain risk, but less so than a certain risk. In that sense, it would 
only be a matter of the existence of a risk, and not of its potency in a given case.  
This distinction between the uncertain existence of a risk and the uncertain reali-
sation of an existent risk has been problematized already in section 2.3 above, but 
its shortcomings are even more evident here. In international environmental law, 
such a distinction could perhaps be made since it would in some cases be possible 
to distinguish between the existence of environmental risks in general (e.g. the 
causal link between toxin X and death of aquatic animals) and their possible reali-
sation in a specific case (e.g. how likely it is that fish will die if toxin X is released 
in the river Y). But in cases concerning human rights, risks are often of a very 
different nature, where it may either be impossible to ever establish causal links or 
where such a distinction would simply be too complicated to make. Consequently, 
this means that what might be defined as uncertain risks must sometimes be ac-
cepted as sufficient also under the ECHR. To exemplify, there are cases (e.g. 
Opuz v. Turkey and Branko Tomašić and Others v. Croatia) where the threat of 
(ex-)husbands towards their wives has been considered real and immediate. Could 
the existence of such a risk ever be certain? And when the risk emanates from an 
individual human being, how could the existence of a risk be separated from its 
possible realisation? In such a case there is no general risk, such as a known toxin 
or industrial activity, there is only an individual risk. While some human actions 
may indeed be highly predictable, one can never say with certainty what a human 
being might do – the human mind does not lend itself to the establishment of 
causal links. If a certain risk was required in such cases before the authorities 
were obliged to act, their responsibility would be very limited indeed. It therefore 
seems inevitable that the Court must accept even risks that are to some extent un-
certain as sufficient to oblige states to act – otherwise, the ECHR rights could not 
be effectively protected. The need to interpret the rights so as to make them effec-
tive thus calls for a norm of precaution. 
The acceptance of uncertain risks is even more evident in Hirsi Jamaa and Others 
v. Italy, where the Court was prepared to accept as real a risk of ill-treatment in 
two steps, where there first was a risk that the applicants would be removed from 
Libya to Somalia or Eritrea, and then – if they actually were removed – that they 
would there face a risk of ill-treatment. This extra step in the chain of risks means 
that, in fact, the very existence of a risk of ill-treatment was uncertain in this case. 
And in the cases of Fadeyeva and – especially – Tătar, the Court evidently low-
ered the standard of proof, thus accepting more tenuous risks. In the Tătar case, 
the Court explicitly said that the state had an obligation to take precautionary 
measures, despite the fact that there was no causal link. In these cases, if nowhere 
else, the Court has indeed been willing to accept a very tenuous risk at a level that 
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seems to correspond to what would be enough under the precautionary principle 
in international environmental law. 
Consequently, too much focus should not be placed on the terminology of the 
Court in regard to risks. The fact that a risk is described with the same terms in 
different cases does not mean that the level of risk is in fact the same, nor does the 
use of different terms mean that the risks are in fact different. This is because it is 
very hard to compare risks that emanate from different sources. In cases such as 
Öneryıldız v. Turkey, when the risk is related to environmental processes and 
chemical reactions, causal links can be established, even if it may be difficult. 
Human behaviour on the other hand – whether it threatens someone’s life through 
direct violence as in the Osman case or affects the general situation in a state 
where an individual may risk ill-treatment – cannot always be explained, as it is 
not always rational and not as such bound by the laws of physics. Thus, when a 
risk of loss of life due to events in the environment is considered real and imme-
diate, it might mean that there is more than a causal link, but when a risk to the 
life or well-being of persons due to human behaviour is considered real and im-
mediate, it might mean that although the risk is uncertain, it is as certain as it 
could be, since no causal link could ever be established. 
The different sources of risks to human rights also motivate that the required lev-
els of risk should vary, due to considerations of effectiveness of protection and 
proportionality. In cases such as the aforementioned Opuz, when risks emanate 
from the human mind, protection would not be effective if very strong risks were 
required. But the threshold must not be set too low either, since it would be im-
possible for a state to prevent all risks due to human behaviour – it is simply too 
unpredictable and such an obligation would be disproportionate. In other cases, 
there may be reasons to set the standard differently. This is further discussed in 
relation to the proportionality aspect below, but it can be observed that in para-
graph 137 of the Budayeva case, the Court itself said that “[t]he scope of the posi-
tive obligations […] would depend on the origin of the threat and the extent to 
which one or the other risk is susceptible to mitigation” (emphasis added). 
In short, it may be hard to claim that there is a common standard in the ECHR as 
to what level of risk is required in order for states to be obliged to take precau-
tionary measures. Different terms are used, and the risks are of such different na-
tures that they cannot easily be compared. What can be said is that, just as the 
precautionary principle in international environmental law requires a minimum 
level of risk, so does the norm of precaution under the ECHR. And although the 
standard may have been set rather high in some cases, the Court has indeed ac-
cepted risks that must be considered quite tenuous. Thus, in regard to the risk as-
pect, the norm in the ECHR and the precautionary principle in international envi-
ronmental law are quite similar. 
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Damage 
Turning now to the aspect of damage, it is clear that a minimum level is required 
here as well – just as it is according to the precautionary principle in international 
environmental law. As is obvious, and has been explicitly stated e.g. in Soering 
and Vilvarajah, the possible infringement of rights must be serious enough to be 
considered a violation of the article in question, in order to oblige states to take 
precautionary measures. This is more of an issue under Articles 3 and 8, than un-
der Article 2, since ill-treatment and infringements of privacy are matters of de-
gree, while the same cannot be said about death. Under Article 3, however, when 
that level is reached, the obligation to take precautionary measures is absolute and 
cannot be refuted with reference to financial implications or other proportionality 
arguments. This is different from the situation under Article 8, where it seems as 
if there is no upper limit above which inaction can be excused – as long as the 
reasons are strong enough. It also seems as if when a violation of a human right is 
expected, it would not matter much to the proportionality assessment how “seri-
ous” the violation would be – i.e. a person in risk of “mild” torture would be just 
as worthy of protection as one in risk of “serious” torture, since both cases reach 
the minimum level. 
Proportionality 
It is evident in the reasoning above that it is hard to separate the elements of the 
norm of precaution, since the proportionality aspect is ever present. Although it is 
not explicitly referred to, it is clear that considerations of proportionality explain 
much of the reasoning of the Court. From a proportionality perspective, the level 
of risk when states are obliged to act may be affected by the circumstances of the 
case. It is therefore sensible that the Court speaks of a real (and immediate) risk in 
cases where the risk has a source that is hard to control – such as human behav-
iour. But if the authorities are in control of a situation – such as in cases concern-
ing people in custody or other institutions – their ability to identify and prevent 
risks is greater, and demanding more from them in terms of due diligence is pro-
portionate. Therefore, the lower risk requirement in the Jasinskis case (not real 
and immediate) is reasonable. Likewise, it is not disproportionate to expect au-
thorities to act to prevent any potential risks, as in İlbeyi Kemaloğlu and Meriye 
Kemaloğlu v. Turkey, when the measures required are very simple and the power 
of the authorities over the situation is substantial. Further, children may be in need 
of more protection than adults – that has also been confirmed under Article 3. 
Although few would openly put a price on human rights, economic factors are 
part of the proportionality assessment even in the ECHR. In Osman, the Court 
stressed the importance of not placing an impossible burden on the state and noted 
that “priorities and resources” call for restrictions on state obligations. And even 
though the obligation under Article 3 to take precautionary measures in the face of 
a risk of ill-treatment has been called absolute, the Court was not, in the case of 
N.  v. UK, prepared to oblige states to protect people suffering from illnesses that 
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could not be properly treated in other countries, since providing medical care 
would be too heavy a burden. It could be argued that what the Court actually con-
sidered in the N. case, was that the sending of a person to a state with less quali-
fied health care would not reach the minimum level of severity required under 
Article 3, but on the other hand a person does not become any less ill or suffer any 
less simply because a state considers their treatment too expensive. Indeed, in the 
previous case of D. v. UK, the suffering caused by lack of treatment for an illness 
was enough to constitute a violation of Article 3. In backing from that position, 
the Court showed that, apparently, the absolute obligation not to remove people 
when they risk ill-treatment, is only absolute when it is convenient. 
It shall also be noted that in retrospective cases, the Court tends to focus on what 
the state knew or ought to have known. This implies that a specific result is not 
demanded from states – indeed, that may be impossible, since some risks cannot 
be prevented. States are thus only obliged to act with due diligence. This is exem-
plified inter alia in paragraph 111 in Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan quoted 
above, where the state was not held responsible for the death of a woman, since 
her decision to set herself on fire had not been predictable. 
The main effect of the precautionary principle in international environmental law 
has been considered to be its influence on the burden and standard of proof, as 
explained in section 2.4 above. Judge Weeramantry has even claimed that the pre-
cautionary principle developed in order to address situations where the conductor 
of potentially dangerous activities has better access to information about the risks 
than those opposing the activities in question (see section 2.4). The most obvious 
consequence of the fact that the ECHR places obligations on states in relation to 
individuals, is that the parties before the ECtHR (usually) are individuals chal-
lenging states.
182
 Because of the unequal parties, the burden on the individual ap-
plicants to substantiate their claims can already be lessened in some cases – this is 
implied inter alia in the case of Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden referred to in 
section 3.3.2.
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 It might therefore be expected that a norm of precaution would 
not be as necessary, or would not have as evident effects under the ECHR, com-
pared to international environmental law, where the parties of disputes are states. 
But in Tătar v. Romania, as well as in Fadeyeva, it was clear that the standard in 
fact was lowered even further – in Tătar with explicit reference to the precaution-
ary principle. In Fadeyeva the Court found a presumption of danger in favour of 
the applicant and in Tătar the lack of sufficiently clear evidence did not exclude 
the finding of a violation of Article 8. But the advantage for the applicants must 
also be the consequence of precaution in other cases, since – just as in internation-
al environmental law – accepting lower levels of risk means de facto lowering the 
standard of proof. The rather more explicit reasoning to this effect in Fadeyeva 
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and Tătar shows, however, that the norm of precaution already present in the 
ECHR may be strengthened through influence from the precautionary principle in 
international environmental law. 
So, there seems to be a norm of precaution in the ECHR – at least in the types of 
cases reviewed. One of the central features of these cases is that the requirement 
for precautionary measures is an extension of the positive obligations of states to 
protect the rights of individuals. As mentioned in section 3.2, positive obligations 
have been recognised under practically all ECHR articles. Given also that most of 
the interests covered by the different rights may be interfered with by other actors 
than the state, there will be a need for the state to protect these interests by pre-
venting violations from occurring. And if something is to be prevented, risks must 
somehow be assessed and acted upon – which is why a norm of precaution is like-
ly to have been applied by the ECtHR already, in regard to other articles as well 
as the ones reviewed here. To sum up the discussion above, a norm of precaution 
in the ECHR may be phrased in the following way: 
If there is a risk, which is more than a mere conjecture, of a violation of a right 
protected by the ECHR, the state must take precautionary measures, as propor-
tionate, to prevent a violation from occurring. This obligation applies to risks that 
the state knows or ought to know about and the mere fact that a risk is tenuous is 
not in itself a sufficient reason for inaction. 
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4 A common norm of precaution 
4.1 A common norm 
Having examined the precautionary principle in international environmental law 
and the norm of precaution that seems to exist within the ECHR, two questions 
remain to discuss. The first one is addressed in this section and concerns whether 
there might be a common norm of precaution in the two examined disciplines. 
The second question is if there are any indications of the existence of a general 
norm, relevant to other fields of public international law as well, and what im-
portance terminology might have in this context. This question requires a rather 
more speculative discussion and is examined in section 4.2. 
In this section, it is argued that although the two norms have so far been referred 
to as being just that – two different norms – their similarities are in fact significant 
enough to motivate a conclusion that there is in fact only one norm. The differ-
ences are mainly due to the fact that this single norm is applied to a variety of 
situations within the two legal regimes and that the assessment is adapted accord-
ingly. But these necessary adaptations are accommodated within the boundaries of 
the proportionality assessment, which is possible since the norm gives great dis-
cretion to states (and/or judiciary) applying it. What the norm essentially does is 
pointing to a number of conditions which must be fulfilled in order for precau-
tionary action to be required in a specific case. These conditions are examined 
below and basically concern the three elements which are considered in sections 2 
and 3 above – risk, damage and proportionality. It is therefore inevitable that this 
section partly overlaps with section 3.4, where some comparison between the 
“two norms” could not be avoided. It shall be noted that this is but one way of 
explaining the components of the norm of precaution in the two regimes exam-
ined. Before turning to the different conditions, the two ways of defining the norm 
presented in sections 2.4 and 3.4 must be remembered. They read as follows: 
The precautionary principle in international environmental law 
If there are plausible indications of potential risks of damage to the environment, 
states are presumed to take precautionary measures, as proportionate, to prevent 
any damage that is not insignificant, even when there is no conclusive evidence to 
prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects. 
The norm of precaution in the ECHR 
If there is a risk, which is more than a mere conjecture, of a violation of a right 
protected by the ECHR, the state must take precautionary measures, as propor-
tionate, to prevent a violation from occurring. This obligation applies to risks that 
the state knows or ought to know about and the mere fact that a risk is tenuous is 
not in itself a sufficient reason for inaction. 
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The first condition necessary for the requirement of precautionary measures is that 
the risk reaches more than a minimum level. This is expressed in the definitions 
above in that measures are required if there are plausible indications of potential 
risks or if there is a risk, which is more than a mere conjecture. It is clear in inter-
national environmental law that hypothetical risks are not enough and in ECtHR 
case law, mere suspicions and conjectures are dismissed as insufficient. As noted 
in section 3.4, however, remarks to this effect would be quite meaningless unless 
risks that were in fact rather tenuous could be accepted as sufficient. And that is 
indeed the case – uncertain or tenuous risks can be enough to require action. 
According to the precautionary principle in international environmental law, pre-
cautionary measures may be required even when the existence of a risk is uncer-
tain – in the words of the definition above: even when there is no conclusive evi-
dence to prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects. Under the norm 
of precaution in the ECHR, it is less obvious that such uncertain risks can be 
enough although inter alia the case of Hirsi Jamaa strongly implies it, with a view 
to the “two-step risk” accepted there, as explained in section 3.4. As explained, 
the difference between the uncertain existence of a risk and the uncertain realisa-
tion of a risk in a given case may be of little significance. Other ECtHR cases also 
indicate the acceptance by the Court of very tenuous risks compatible to uncertain 
ones – not just the Fadeyeva and Tătar cases, but also e.g. İlbeyi Kemaloğlu and 
Meriye Kemaloğlu v. Turkey. This motivates the phrase in the ECHR definition 
according to which the mere fact that a risk is tenuous is not in itself a sufficient 
reason for inaction. So far, the two manifestations of the norm of precaution ap-
pear to be essentially the same. 
However, there still seems to be a difference between the precautionary principle 
in international environmental law and the ECHR norm, in that the latter appears 
to tend more towards the requirement for slightly more potent risks, than the pre-
cautionary principle in international environmental law. On closer consideration, 
however, this apparent divergence becomes rather illusory. A first reason for this 
is that it is difficult to compare risks of such different kinds as in these two re-
gimes and, as noted in section 3.4, what appears to be a different standard may in 
fact be very similar. A second reason is that there is no absolute demand for action 
as soon as an uncertain or tenuous risk exists – a stronger risk may be required to 
motivate action e.g. if the damage at stake is small. This is due to the proportion-
ality assessment which must be made and which requires the level of risk to vary 
in different cases. Stronger risks must therefore sometimes be required in envi-
ronmental cases as well. This would have been obvious if the same amount of 
case law concerning international environmental law, as concerning the ECHR, 
had been available. Consequently, the occurrence of “high risk cases” under the 
ECHR does not mean that the ECHR norm sets a different standard. 
It may be argued, however, that the variation in the sources of risks would require 
different norms of precaution. It is true that the sources of risks vary greatly in the 
60 
  
cases under the ECHR and – as the Court noted in Budayeva – the obligations of 
the state must vary accordingly. Although risks to the environment may also be of 
different sources, environmental risks are nevertheless a more homogenous group. 
The environment is physical and thus subjected only to physical risks, encompass-
ing everything between chemical reactions and deforestation. Such risks can also 
threaten human rights, since humans are indeed physical beings. But humans are 
also – unlike the environment – exposed to risks emanating from the human mind. 
Not only can human rights be of a non-physical nature, but they may also be at 
risk due to psychological factors in the minds of others, such as in the Osman 
case, where the threat originated from the thoughts of a disturbed man. Consider-
ing these variations and the high unpredictability of some risks – especially those 
from the human mind – there may in fact be some categories of risks to human 
rights where it would in most cases be disproportionate to require action in the 
face of an uncertain risk. In regard to the environment, it might be harder to dis-
tinguish any such group of risks. But this does not call for two different norms of 
precaution. It would be inconvenient to attempt a definition of different groups of 
cases in order to prescribe different levels of risk. The differences would be hard 
to explain and all possible variations could not be encompassed anyway. The only 
reasonable solution is therefore to grant states certain discretion, which is precise-
ly what the proportionality aspect of the norm of precaution does. 
To sum up, the norm of precaution sets the same conditions in regard to risks in 
both legal regimes, but the meaning of the conditions will vary with the circum-
stances of the individual case to which they are applied and cannot be further 
specified in a definition of the norm. The norm of precaution means that lower 
levels of risk are accepted and – as has been pointed out in sections 2.4 and 3.4 – 
the main effect is therefore on the standard (and/or burden) of proof. 
The second condition that must be met in order to require precautionary measures 
is that the damage reaches more than a minimum level. This is required in both 
branches of public international law and this similarity was noted already in sec-
tion 3.4. In the two definitions of the norm presented above, precautionary 
measures may be required to prevent any damage (to the environment) that is not 
insignificant or a violation of a right protected by the ECHR. Like the requirement 
for a minimum level of risk, a minimum level of damage is also necessary due to 
the aspect of proportionality – it would not be reasonable to require prevention of 
every negative effect. What is necessary will also depend on the level of risk, 
since a weaker risk will require the support of a more serious damage in order to 
motivate precautionary measures, when weighed against other interests in the 
proportionality assessment. Under the ECHR the minimum level is decided by the 
relevant article of the Convention – it is only if an actual violation of a human 
right protected by the Convention is at risk that precaution is required. Likewise, a 
specific level of damage sometimes makes precautionary measures an absolute 
requirement under the ECHR. Such is the case under Article 3, where other inter-
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ests cannot outweigh the need for precaution which presents itself as soon as the 
appropriate levels of risk and damage are at hand. At first glance, the lines seem 
harder to draw in international environmental law and the limits appear much 
more fluid and undecided. But this does not mean that there are two versions of 
the norm of precaution – this is not a substantive difference between two norms 
but rather an illusion due to the nature of this investigation. As argued in section 
2.4, the precautionary principle in international environmental law is not really 
applied on its own, but is rather used to interpret other norms of international en-
vironmental law. In this thesis, however, it has been reviewed in relation to inter-
national environmental law in general. If it had instead been scrutinised as part of 
a specific international environmental treaty – the way it is applied in practice – it 
would probably have been clear that it can have the same kind of “sharp” limits as 
the norm of precaution can be given under the ECHR. As an example, there may 
be a norm of international environmental law prescribing an absolute ban on the 
killing of any individuals of a specific species of animals. The minimum level of 
damage required would then be the death of such an animal. Likewise, if the ban 
was absolute, no arguments of proportionality could be used to justify action that 
would lead to the death of such an animal. The situation would then be the same 
as under Article 3 of the ECHR. To conclude, this shows that the level of damage 
required will depend on the situation in the instant case as well as on the require-
ments of any other norms of public international law to which the norm of precau-
tion is applied. Therefore, any differences in the required minimum levels do not 
mean that the norm of precaution is not the same, but that the circumstances to 
which it is applied are different. 
Next condition necessary for a requirement of precautionary measures has already 
been implied and partly discussed, which is inevitable since the conditions are 
dependent on each other. The third condition is that the combined weight of the 
risk and the potential damage is greater than that of any other conflicting inter-
est. Except when other norms prescribe absolute obligations (as discussed above), 
states can only be obliged to take precautionary measures when considerations of 
other interests do not make such measures disproportionate. This is indicated in 
the two definitions of the norm, in the phrase that measures are to be taken as 
proportionate. The proportionality assessment thus required is not outlined in 
detail and nor could or should it be – it is in the very nature of proportionality that 
it allows for discretion and that the factors to be considered will vary with the 
individual case. Since the norm of precaution is aimed at dealing with risks and 
unclear future situations of varying kinds it is necessary to have the possibility of 
discretion in order to avoid unreasonable results. The norm must be somewhat 
undefined, since it must be possible to apply it to an undefined variety of situa-
tions – even within one single field of international law. 
If the interests over which precautionary measures must be prioritised are finan-
cial or practical, it may be easier to find that the interest protected by the norm of 
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precaution ought to be favoured. The very existence of a norm of precaution ap-
plicable to an interest would seem to give it an advantage over other interests. But 
under the ECHR the situation may sometimes occur where two protected interests 
are to be weighed against each other, which must entail a more difficult assess-
ment. A clear example is the Osman case, where people’s lives were at risk due to 
another person. The Court noted that the possibilities to prevent the perpetrator 
from attacking were limited because his human rights also had to be considered – 
inter alia the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s liberty. The situation un-
der the ECHR can thus be one where the human rights of one person must some-
how be weighed against the human rights of another person and this could moti-
vate requirements of higher levels of risk, since the rights of potentially innocent 
persons might otherwise too easily be infringed. Similar complications may not 
arise quite as often in international environmental law. 
On the other hand, a complication when making a proportionality assessment in 
international environmental law is the taking into account of the impact of any 
decision on future generations. Intergenerational equity is an important idea in 
international environmental law and may be expected to reinforce any arguments 
in favour of precautionary measures. It is clear, however, that if future interests 
were to be given full weight, almost any human activity might be considered dan-
gerous. Considerations of this kind are bound to complicate the proportionality 
assessment. They seem, however, not to be a problem for the ECtHR, which is 
concerned only with the human rights at stake in the case before it. 
The considerations to be made in regard to risk and damage, and the considera-
tions mentioned so far under the proportionality assessment, all concern the objec-
tive aspects of the assessment of whether or not precautionary measures must be 
taken. These aspects concern only the factual situation and are independent of the 
state involved. But there are also aspects pertaining to the individual state – they 
may here be referred to as subjective aspects – which are important if the question 
of state responsibility is to be evaluated. The mere fact that there is a sufficient 
risk of a sufficiently grave damage and that these two factors outweigh another 
interest may be enough to say that precautionary measures ought to be taken, but 
depending on the circumstances in the state, such a requirement may still be dis-
proportionate. It has been mentioned in section 2 that states can only be held re-
sponsible if they have not acted with due diligence and in ECtHR case law it has 
been clarified that states must not be given an impossible or disproportionate bur-
den. To evaluate if states have indeed acted with due diligence, it may thus be 
necessary to consider the situation in the relevant state and its available resources. 
Such considerations are possible inter alia according to the idea of intragenera-
tional justice in international environmental law (i.e. equality between rich and 
poor countries) and the margin of appreciation in the ECHR (which allows for 
tolerance of certain legal and cultural differences between states). These consider-
ations are not specifically prescribed by the norm of precaution itself, but by the 
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surrounding legal context. The possibility of taking such factors as economy and 
resources etc. into account implies that the means by which to protect a given in-
terest may vary, as long as they are suitable for the purpose. At the same time, 
there can be no requirement for states to achieve a certain result, i.e. to always 
manage to protect the interest at risk, since that may be impossible. This was ex-
plicit in the ECtHR Budayeva case, where the Court noted that state obligations 
must be affected by the extent to which risks are actually possible to mitigate. 
Lingering a moment on the topic of due diligence, it shall be noted that when the 
ECtHR has assessed possible violations retrospectively, it has often focused on 
whether or not the state knew or ought to have known about the risk in question. 
This is included in the ECHR definition of the norm above and it is an important 
part of the third condition (proportionality) which is necessary for the requirement 
of precautionary measures. Although the precautionary principle in international 
law does not in any of the exemplified versions in section 2.1 explicitly state such 
a requirement, it must be considered inherent in the very ideas of proportionality 
and due diligence. Firstly because it would be unreasonable to hold states respon-
sible for failing to take precautionary measures to prevent risks that they could not 
have known about. Secondly, it would be equally unreasonable if states were not 
held responsible for failing to take measures to prevent risks that they ought to 
have known about, since a state could then easily escape responsibility by claim-
ing ignorance. This means that states must exercise due diligence in identifying 
potential risks as well as in preventing them. If precaution is to matter, it must 
mean that states are to be pro-active – not that the authorities can sit idle. 
Having now examined the conditions under which precautionary measures can be 
required, it is clear that they are the same in both regimes of public international 
law. The sources of risk vary, but if a risk is more than hypothetical it can be suf-
ficient to demand action, even if it is tenuous or uncertain. The types of damage 
vary, but if the possible damage is more than insignificant and/or reaches the lev-
els required by the other norms to which the norm of precaution is applied, it can 
be sufficient to demand action. The other interests to be weighed against the need 
for precautionary measures also vary, but as long as it can be considered propor-
tionate with a view inter alia to state resources and what the state knows or ought 
to know about the risk, precautionary measures can be demanded. The norm of 
precaution is one that leaves much room for discretion, which is necessary since 
risks are by their very nature unpredictable. In order to prevent risks, an assess-
ment of each individual situation must therefore be made and with the endless 
variation of possible scenarios even within one legal regime, it ought not to be 
surprising that the norm of precaution can give only a rough outline of what fac-
tors to assess. 
There is also another reason for the relative “vagueness” of the norm. It was noted 
already in section 2.4 that the main function of the precautionary principle in in-
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ternational environmental law is to guide the interpretation of other norms of in-
ternational environmental law and strengthen environmental protection by lower-
ing the threshold for when action is required. Indeed, the precautionary principle 
is often included as a norm of interpretation in international instruments, as evi-
dent in section 2.1. Under the ECHR the requirement for precautionary measures 
likewise seem to be the result of the need to interpret the rights so as to make 
them effective. Thus, the norm of precaution is not about granting protection to 
interests previously ignored, but to strengthen protection of interests that are al-
ready regulated. The norm of precaution is thereby mainly a general guideline and 
a reminder that if something is to be effectively protected, an anticipatory ap-
proach is necessary. Seen from this perspective, the norm of precaution does not 
need to be specific, since more detailed conditions are provided by the other 
norms to which it is applied. 
In the introduction to this section, the two definitions of the norm of precaution 
from sections 2 and 3 are recalled. The norm has evidently been described differ-
ently, but that is mostly due to the different terminology used in each field of law. 
Since the conditions for requiring precautionary measures are found to be the 
same, and since the norm is thereby to be seen as one and the same, the two defi-
nitions can easily be merged in to one, as below. This is certainly not the only way 
to phrase the norm of precaution, but simply an example. 
The norm of precaution 
If there are plausible indications of potential risks of damage to a protected inter-
est, states must take precautionary measures, as proportionate, to prevent any 
damage that is not insignificant. This obligation applies to risks that the state 
knows or ought to know about and the mere fact there is no conclusive evidence to 
prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects, or that the risk is other-
wise tenuous, is not in itself a sufficient reason for inaction. 
4.2 A common term and the possibility of a general norm 
Having found that the norm of precaution is common to both international envi-
ronmental law and the ECHR, the question follows if there are any indications of 
a general norm of precaution. Firstly, it shall be emphasised that it is not for this 
thesis to give a definite answer, but only to discuss a few relevant aspects. In or-
der for a norm to be general, it might be expected to exist in several, if not all, 
fields of public international law. At best, this thesis only demonstrates its exist-
ence in international environmental law and perhaps in the ECHR regime – two 
fields which do not represent a very large share of public international law in to-
tal, especially considering the fact that even the human rights field encompasses 
so much more than just the ECHR. However, just as a number of cases from the 
ECtHR concerning a few articles of the ECHR can indicate the existence of a 
65 
  
norm of precaution there, the existence of a norm in the two branches examined 
can also indicate that the norm might be general. 
The main reason to suspect that a norm of precaution may be relevant in other 
regimes of public international law as well as the ones reviewed is the fact that the 
norm of precaution is motivated in both international environmental law and in 
the ECHR by the need for effective protection of the interests in question. It seems 
evident that any obligation to protect an interest must be anticipatory by nature, 
since protection will be of no use when damage has already occurred. The ECHR 
has also motivated precautionary measures with the need to ensure that human 
rights are effective. This would indicate that a norm of precaution could be rele-
vant to any legal regime which aims at the protection of some kind of interest 
against damage. A brief speculation might here be in place, regarding some possi-
ble fields of public international law where a norm of precaution may be relevant. 
For example, what is the meaning of international humanitarian law if not to pro-
tect civilians and combatants against unnecessary suffering and death in interna-
tional armed conflicts? Could not a norm of precaution be relevant there, e.g. in 
relation to the obligation not to attack civilian targets? Further, are there not 
norms for the protection of certain economic interests in international trade law? 
Could not a norm of precaution be relevant there? And has not, in fact, a right to 
pre-emptive self-defence (albeit highly contested) been discussed in relation to the 
prohibition on the use of force? There may surely be other examples and in order 
to examine the existence of a general norm of precaution, regulation such as this 
might be an appropriate place to start. 
If there actually is a general norm of precaution, it has at least not been acknowl-
edged as such. Evidence of that – or perhaps the reason for it – is that there is no 
general term to describe it. But the lack of a general term does not preclude the 
existence of a general norm – just as the lack of a common term in international 
environmental law and the ECHR regime does not mean that there is no common 
norm. However, a common term in international environmental law and the 
ECHR regime might further the development of the common norm. And in the 
long run, it may also further the development of a general norm – or the recogni-
tion of such a norm, if it already exists. This is simply because a common norm 
may be a source of inspiration. This can be the case with the norm of precaution, 
but also with other norms. Thus, the relationship between international environ-
mental law and the ECHR regime, and the common norm of precaution in these 
two disciplines, is discussed below in order to exemplify what may be true for 
public international law in general. 
Before considering the implications of terminology more closely, a brief note on 
terms in general seems appropriate. As is evident in many situations of everyday 
life a term (and language in general) is not always capable of communicating the 
intended message, and even if it is capable of doing so, the desired result is not 
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always obtained. There are various theories about the functions of terms in law 
and law making, but the assumption here will be that terms can have different 
functions, and that they can have more than one function at a time. Terms may 
thus be used simply to describe something, but they may also – perhaps simulta-
neously – be used (or have as an unintended effect) to convey other messages, 
encouraging certain actions etc. The success of any communicative endeavour 
will depend inter alia on the general situation in which the term is used and on the 
experiences, knowledge and values etc. of the receiver. The use of a certain term 
may lead to better understanding of the idea it aims at describing, but it may also 
just mask pre-existing confusion about the actual content of the idea, if the users 
of the term attribute different properties to it.
184
 These initial remarks are im-
portant to keep in mind. 
Turning now to the terminology used in relation to the norm of precaution, the 
term precautionary principle is used to describe the norm of precaution when it 
appears in international environmental law, while in the ECHR, there is no specif-
ic term at all, even though the norm seemingly exists there as well. The first ques-
tion is why the terminology is different, when the norm appears to be the same. It 
would seem that, despite the fact that the norm is in essence the same, it would not 
be reasonable to expect it to be referred to with the same term – at least not initial-
ly. This is because general norms of public international law are not enforced on 
all the different branches of public international law “from above”. If that were 
the case, the terms ought indeed to have been the same. Rather, general norms are 
derived from their use in the different disciplines. In other words, general norms 
may be expected to develop in the context of the different disciplines, before be-
coming general. The formation of legal norms in one field of law might therefore 
happen independently of any similar developments in other fields and any similar-
ity in the terms chosen to describe these norms would then seem unlikely. 
This kind of simultaneous but independent development appears to be the reason 
for the different terminology of the norm of precaution in the two examined legal 
regimes. Consequently, it could potentially explain differences in terminology in 
other fields of public international law as well. In international environmental law, 
the introduction of the precautionary principle is by some (see section 2.2) seen as 
the third step in the evolution of environmental protection – international law was 
initially only interested in the retroactive aspect of making amends for actual 
damages, but the principle of prevention moved focus from reparation to anticipa-
tion, which was reinforced by the introduction of the precautionary principle, call-
ing for action at an even earlier stage. In a way, a similar development has taken 
place in the ECHR regime, since positive obligations have gradually been recog-
nised under most articles, thus adding an anticipatory aspect in situations when 
violations caused by non-state actors are to be prevented. In the cases from the 
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ECtHR reviewed in this thesis, however, there is little awareness of the precau-
tionary principle in international environmental law until recent years and even in 
the Tătar case it is treated rather as an alien phenomenon. The overlap of the pre-
cautionary principle with the “ECHR norm” – a norm which may be traced back 
at least to the Soering case from 1989 – appears to be overlooked in that case. 
Thus, the development of the norm of precaution in each field of law appears to 
be simultaneous but independent. 
While a norm of precaution thus existed in the ECHR before the Tătar case, be-
cause it was considered necessary to make the rights in the Convention effective, 
the Tătar case shows that inspiration from the precautionary principle in interna-
tional environmental law is still relevant. This is because reference to the precau-
tionary principle in international environmental law may shed light on the norm of 
precaution that is already in use in the ECHR, as noted in section 3.4. A relevant 
question may be what function a common term (or a general term) would actually 
have, considering the fact that a common norm apparently can develop in the ab-
sence of a common term. The Tătar case indicates part of the answer. The two 
separate (but matching) lines of development of the norm of precaution indicate 
that the existence of some fundamental likeness between the two regimes, or at 
least between the situations they regulate, may be enough to give rise to a com-
mon norm. In this case the basic need for the protection of the interests in question 
to be effective seems to be the driving force, as noted above. But there is room for 
improvement of the current situation, and a term common to both international 
environmental law and the ECHR regime, to describe the norm of precaution, may 
be beneficial for several reasons. This will now be explained. And as noted above, 
the example of what is beneficial in the context of the norm of precaution com-
mon to these two legal regimes, may also have bearing on a (possible) general 
norm of precaution and/or on public international law in general. 
Firstly, the lack of a common term makes the identification of the common norm 
more difficult. A common term could give a hint that, maybe, the underlying 
norm is the same as well, and thus lead researchers and practitioners to look in a 
certain direction. Consequently, there seems to be a risk that the existence of a 
common norm is overlooked if it is not spoken of in common terms. Indeed, the 
fact that there seems to be a norm of precaution at all in the ECHR might under 
the present conditions be surprising to some, not to mention the fact that the norm 
appears to be essentially the same as the precautionary principle in international 
environmental law. In the long run, the unacknowledged existence of common 
norms may support a false impression that the discrepancies between the separate 
fields of public international law are more substantial than they actually are. Some 
claim that public international law is already moving in a direction where its vari-
ous disciplines are distancing themselves from each other, causing potential con-
flicts between norms of different fields – a phenomenon referred to as the frag-
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mentation of international law.
185
 It might be assumed that the use of different 
terms to describe the same norm in different fields of public international law 
would hardly curb any such advances. 
A common (or general) term could not only be expected to help identifying the 
actual use of the same norm, but it would also help developing it. Putting an idea 
into words or giving a name – a term – to a norm, furthers the understanding of 
what the norm really is. But more than just making evident what already exists, 
terms may also change and shape the norm they describe, by connecting it to all 
the expectations associated with the term. Likewise, if the norm changes, that will 
affect the understanding of the term. Thus, terms and norms – i.e. law and the 
language used to describe it – will fertilise each other. So, if the same term is used 
to describe what was thought to be two separate norms it seems evident that the 
term will not only acknowledge that the norms are one, but also create a bridge 
between the two manifestations of the norm, enabling them to influence each oth-
er. A common term for the norm of precaution in international environmental law 
and in the ECHR regime would therefore further the development of the norm of 
precaution in general. If the parallels between the two disciplines were highlight-
ed, the specific use of the norm in each field could inspire the other. Even in this 
limited study it is evident that some of the common features of the norm of pre-
caution are more elaborated and more easily identified in one legal regime than in 
the other. 
There are several examples of this. One example is the classification of risks as 
certain or uncertain, which is upheld in international environmental law, and 
which has furthered the understanding of the risks assessed under the ECHR. But 
likewise, an attempted application of the demand for an uncertain risk in the 
ECHR regime has also clarified that the difference between the uncertain exist-
ence of a risk and the uncertain realisation of a risk in a specific case is rather 
illusory – which in turn can further the understanding of precaution in internation-
al environmental law. Another example of how one manifestation of the norm of 
precaution can further the understanding of the other one, is the fact the function 
of precautionary measures as promoting the protection of the interest in question 
is better illustrated in the ECHR, where the positive obligations of states are ex-
plicitly referred to. A third example is that it is clear in ECtHR case law that states 
ought not to be held responsible for risks they are not able to know about or pre-
vent. It would be unreasonable if this was not also the case in international envi-
ronmental law. Thus, the understanding of the norm of precaution can be promot-
ed if its two manifestations are compared. However, the use of a common term 
may have more far-reaching effects than this. It seems likely that if practitioners 
of one discipline were given reason to look to other disciplines for inspiration, 
further similarities might be discovered as well and along with them additional 
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sources of inspiration. In the long run, the use of common terms to describe com-
mon norms could therefore contribute to increased cross-fertilisation between the 
different branches of public international law, which would develop each of the 
branches as well as public international law in general and lead to a higher level 
of harmonisation. And if common norms are acknowledged as such in a number 
of fields of public international law, it may inspire the use of the same norm in 
other fields as well, thereby gradually expanding common norms into general 
ones. In this specific case, perhaps the use of a common term for the common 
norm of precaution would increase the likelihood of its becoming (or being recog-
nised as) a general norm. 
A very concrete difficulty that a common term for the norm of precaution could 
help abating, is the reluctance on behalf of many states to sufficiently protect the 
environment. As a common good, and as an entity without the ability to speak for 
itself, the environment is inescapably at risk of being abused. This would perhaps 
motivate a higher level of protection and regulation in international environmental 
law compared to other fields of law and the need for a term in order to strengthen 
the norm of precaution seems more pressing. But the fact that there is a term (pre-
cautionary principle) and that the norm of precaution is thereby acknowledged, 
may not be enough, since the norm appears not to be recognised in other disci-
plines of public international law. This makes the precautionary principle stand 
out as if it were something rather unique. It can easily be imagined that a state 
which is already reluctant to the taking of measures for the protection of the envi-
ronment will be even more unwilling to do so if the precautionary principle is 
seen as embodying an odd requirement, sui generis. The discussion referred to in 
section 2.1 about whether to use the term precautionary principle or precaution-
ary approach in international environmental law is an indication of the fear on 
behalf of some states that precautionary obligations would be cumbersome. But if 
it was made evident – through the use of a common term – that the same kind of 
requirement exists under the ECHR, that might contribute to a normalisation of 
the norm of precaution and prove that, in fact, society would not crumble by the 
mere introduction of precautionary measures. 
Introducing a common term for the norm of precaution in international environ-
mental law and the ECHR regime is not entirely unproblematic, however. While 
inspiration from another branch of public international law may be beneficial to 
each discipline, a common term might also lead to the importation of ideas which 
ought not to be imported into other fields of law without due consideration. As an 
example, it was argued in section 3.4 above that it may be inappropriate to catego-
rise risks to human rights as certain or uncertain risks, as may be done in interna-
tional environmental law, since risks to human rights may be of a different kind 
than risks to the environment. If the use of a common term led to the unreserved 
incorporation into the ECHR regime of the norm of precaution exactly as it is ap-
plied in international environmental law (or vice versa), problems would undoubt-
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edly ensue. Apart from that issue, terms are interpreted differently when appear-
ing in different contexts, as noted above, and using the same term in two disci-
plines of public international law therefore does not guarantee the same effects. 
Further, the understanding of a term can change over time and the norm of pre-
caution might also develop in different directions in the two disciplines, in which 
case the use of the same term could lead to increased confusion. Thus, a common 
term should not be introduced too easily, because if the differences between the 
manifestations of the norm in each regime are too substantial, a common term 
would not bridge the gap but rather hide it under linguistic make-up, and thereby 
hinder the identification and reduction of the discrepancies. The same might be 
equally true for other norms and in other branches of public international law. 
Consequently, while it is important to acknowledge the similarities between the 
different legal regimes and their take on similar problems – such as the need for 
precautionary measures – the differences must not be overlooked. Considering the 
variety of issues regulated throughout public international law it would be foolish, 
at the very least, to expect any norm to be interpreted and applied in the exact 
same way in every discipline. That would not only be unrealistic but undesirable 
and in the case of the norm of precaution it would in fact deprive the norm of one 
of its main characteristics, which is the proportionality aspect. The norm of pre-
caution as described in this thesis is defined by its room for discretion and the 
inherent adaptation to varying circumstances. If the norm was not applied in a 
way that took into account the varying sources of risks and other specific features 
of each field of public international law, it would lose its function. Careful con-
siderations and adaptations are necessary. 
If a common term was to be used in international environmental law and the 
ECHR regime, it would have to be one that would indicate that the norm is one 
and the same, while still respecting the need for adaptations to the individual cir-
cumstances. The invention of an entirely new term might be considered, but it 
would seem unnecessary when a term already exists in international environmen-
tal law. It would also be difficult to replace the precautionary principle in interna-
tional environmental law with another term, since it is by now well-established. A 
suggestion could therefore be to refer to the norm of precaution as the precaution-
ary principle in the ECHR, and the precautionary principle in international en-
vironmental law, respectively. In this way the term would be both common and 
specific. The term could also be adapted to any other field of public international 
law where the norm may also exist. However, a disadvantage of this term would 
be that it might still appear too strongly connected to international environmental 
law and even if the ECtHR may be able to handle that, the change in terminology 
would perhaps seem insignificant in international environmental law and the term 
might consequently appear too familiar to encourage influences from other disci-
plines – which would be one of the purposes of a common term. 
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Finding an appropriate term is not an easy task, and it is not for this thesis to per-
form it. However, the appropriate term ought perhaps not to be chosen, but rather 
it should be allowed to develop over time. Therefore, a reasonable conclusion 
would seem to be that the important thing – regardless of the specific term – is to 
recognise and emphasise that although the norm of precaution is essentially one 
and the same in international environmental law and in the ECHR regime, it is not 
– and should not – be applied identically. Recognition of this fact could prompt 
the development of the norm of precaution in the two regimes, as well as spark 
ideas in other branches of public international law where a norm of precaution 
may be needed to strengthen protection of a threatened interest or where a norm of 
precaution already exists, under the disguise of another term. The fact that the use 
of terms and the use of norms may not always correspond is regrettable but pre-
ventable. When lawyers identify the existence of a common norm without a 
common term, there are two things they can do to improve the situation. The first 
is to come to terms with it. The second is, perhaps, to find a common term for it. 
As for the norm of precaution, further studies will show what the proper cause of 
action might be.  
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5 Conclusion 
It would be pretentious to claim that this thesis proves the existence of a norm of 
precaution which is common to international environmental law and the ECHR 
regime. It does not. Such a claim would have to be supported by more extensive 
studies of the precautionary principle in international environmental law on the 
one hand, and much more extensive studies of ECtHR practice on the other, in 
order to be substantiated. Especially regarding the ECHR it must be remembered 
that only some cases, regarding some aspects of a few articles have been scruti-
nised and that the remainder of the case law could point in other directions. What 
this thesis might provide, however, is a starting point for further investigations of 
the subject and a possible indication of a likely result. 
Regardless of the success of the attempt to indicate a common norm of precaution, 
the thesis may hopefully provide some input into a general debate on the common 
features and divergences of the various regimes of public international law. The 
investigation still suggests that apparent discrepancies, e.g. the prevalence of a 
certain term, may not be as conspicuous as they seem when exposed to closer 
scrutiny. In other words, it may be rewarding to look below the surface of a matter 
and beyond its terminology. But although terms used to describe legal phenomena 
can be misleading, the use of the right term in the right place can strengthen the 
law it refers to. Further, the mere fact that risk assessments can display similarities 
in very diverse situations, such as when chemicals threaten the environment or 
when individuals are threatened by dangerous stalkers, is in itself a reason to con-
sider if some questions are so fundamental to the nature of law, that they are om-
nipresent. When such issues are found, this thesis suggests that the possibility of a 
general norm, perhaps accompanied by a general term, may be of interest for fur-
ther examination. The need for precautionary measures may be such an issue. 
The norm of precaution may be one example of how apparent differences between 
the branches of public international law may be illusory. Identifying other exam-
ples of false discrepancies could in time reveal the true nature of public interna-
tional law and remind lawyers not to lose sight of the bigger picture – of public 
international law as a single system. A strict categorisation of public international 
law in different fields, even regarding issues that ought to be considered in a gen-
eral context, may be a reflection of the many human attempts throughout society 
to categorise reality in understandable portions. However, the annoying truth may 
be that the world is sometimes too complicated for human categorisation. This 
may be true about humans and the environment, about international environmen-
tal law and human rights law or about public international law at large. Some 
things, such as the approach to precaution in international environmental law and 
in the ECHR regime, may be similar even though they appear different. That may 
be a complicated fact, but it is a truth we must come to terms with.  
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